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DIGNITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE US SUPREME 
COURT 
Bharat Malkani1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea of dignity is central to moral and legal debates about the death penalty worldwide. 
Philosophers,2 theologians,3 and drafters of international human rights law4 have all referred to 
dignity in the context of capital punishment, as have judges on constitutional courts around the 
globe.5 In the US Supreme Court, the term dignity has generally been used to uphold the 
constitutionality of capital punishment, but this has largely gone unnoticed because the role of 
dignity in the Court’s capital punishment case law has received little academic attention.6 The 
1 With thanks to Dr Stephen Smith, Professor Fiona de Londras, Professor John Coggon, and Professor Jon Yorke 
for comments on earlier drafts. All errors are attributable to me only. 
2 Immanuel Kant notably used the concept of dignity to argue in favor of capital punishment. See IMMANUEL 
KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary J. Gregor ed., Mary J Gregor trans., 1996) and n.111 infra and 
accompanying text. Other philosophical treatments of capital punishment include MATTHEW KRAMER, THE ETHICS 
OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF EVIL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (2011);TOM 
SORRELL, MORAL THEORY AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987); LLOYD H. STEFFEN, EXECUTING JUSTICE: THE 
MORAL MEANING OF THE DEATH PENALTY (2d ed. 2006).   
3 For example, Pope Francis has repeatedly called for the abolition of the death penalty on the grounds of its 
incompatibility with Catholicism. In an address to the US Congress on September 24, 2015, Pope Francis said that 
the death penalty should be abolished because “every human person is endowed with an inalienable dignity, and 
society can only benefit from the rehabilitation of those convicted of crimes.” See Pope Francis, Apostolic journey - 
United States of America: Visit to the Congress of the United States of America (Washington D.C., 24 September 
2015), https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/speeches/2015/september/documents/papa-
francesco_20150924_usa-us-congress.html. The US Conference of Catholic Bishops has also based their opposition 
to the death penalty on dignitarian grounds: “Even when people deny the dignity of others, we must still recognize 
that their dignity is a gift from God and is not something that is earned or lost through their behavior. Respect for 
life applies to all, even the perpetrators of terrible acts.” COMMITTEE ON DOMESTIC POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS (USCCB), A CULTURE OF LIFE AND THE PENALTY OF DEATH (2005) 11.  
4 The Preamble to the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights reads: 
“abolition of the death penalty contributes to enhancement of human dignity and progressive development of human 
rights”. 
5 For an outline of jurisdictions that have invoked the concept of dignity in decisions relating to capital punishment, 
see Paolo G. Carozza, “My Friend is a Stranger”: The Death Penalty and the Global Ius Commune of Human 
Rights, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1043-1077 (2003).  
6 Helen Knowles has considered the way in which various justices have understood the relationship between dignity 
and the death penalty. See Helen Knowles, A Dialogue on Death Penalty Dignity, 11(2) CRIMINOL. CRIM. JUST. 115 
(2011). Although several other scholars have addressed this topic, they have done so within broader studies of 
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Court’s use, though, is remarkable because in legal discourses, respect for dignity is usually 
associated with the abolitionist position.7 This anomaly requires attention because the normative 
strength of the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence depends in part on whether the Court has 
offered convincing reasons for the way in which it has invoked the idea of dignity.8  
This Article therefore explains how and why the Court has used dignity to justify the 
retention of the death penalty. It is also argued that dignity should not be used to uphold the 
constitutionality of capital punishment, and should instead provide a framework for finding the 
death penalty to be contrary to the Eighth Amendment prohibition on “cruel and unusual 
punishments.” In short, I argue that in the context of capital punishment, the idea of dignity 
involves the relationship between (a) the “human dignity” of the people involved in the crime, 
(b) the dignity of the wider community in whose name the death penalty is being imposed (what 
I term “communitarian dignity”), and (c) the dignity of the legal institution that administers 
capital punishment (“institutional dignity”). To date, the Supreme Court has not adequately 
dignity in the Court’s jurisprudence more generally, and their accounts of dignity and the death penalty specifically 
are therefore brief. See, for example, Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 772-778 (2006); Leslie Meltzner Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 169, 222-224 (2011). Other scholars have focused on dignity and one aspect of capital punishment. See, 
for example, Nicole Dailo, “Give me Dignity by Giving me Death”: Using Balancing to Uphold Death Row 
Volunteers’ Dignity Interests amidst Executive Clemency, 23 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 249, 264 (2014) 
(focusing on dignity and volunteers for execution); Richard J. Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman: Mental Illness, the 
Death Penalty, and Human Dignity 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 257 (2007) (focusing on dignity, mental illness and the 
death penalty); Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, The Death of Dignity, in IS THE DEATH PENALTY DYING? EUROPEAN 
AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 204 (Austin Sarat and Jürgen Martschukat eds., 2011). (focusing on dignity and 
methods of execution).  
7 The Constitutional Court of South Africa, the Hungarian Constitutional Court, and the Supreme Court of Canada 
have all used the term dignity when declaring the death penalty unlawful. See n x below, and accompanying text. 
8 I do not mean to suggest that the legitimacy of the Court’s decisions depend wholly on the way in which it has 
invoked dignity. There are many other factors which will affect an observer’s perception of the legitimacy of any 
judicial opinion. See, for example, Martha Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish If They Publish? Or 
Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose A Greater Problem? 44 AM. U. 
L. REV. 757 (1995) (citing stability, certainty, predictability; consistency, and fidelity to authority as factors that 
affect the perceived legitimacy of a judicial decision); James L. Gibson, Understandings of Justice: Institutional 
Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political Tolerance 23 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 469 (1989); Tom R. Tyler and 
Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme 
Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson 25 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 621 (1991);  
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addressed the relationship between these types of dignity. If it were to do so, the Court would be 
compelled to hold that the death penalty is contrary to respect for dignity, and is therefore 
unconstitutional. 
 To make these arguments, this Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, an outline is 
provided of how non-American jurisdictions have found capital punishment to be inconsistent 
with respect for human dignity. Although the idea of human dignity in particular has historically 
been absent from debates within the US about punishments generally, it is notable that the US 
Supreme Court has invoked various conceptions of dignity in a number of constitutional 
contexts.9 In Part II, therefore, we will address how the Court has used dignity in its death 
penalty jurisprudence. We will see two ways in which Justices Brennan and Marshall used 
dignity to justify the judicial abolition of capital punishment in the 1970s, and we will see four 
ways in which dignity has conversely been used by other Justices since the 1970s to justify 
retention. It will be seen that there is little consistency in the conceptions of dignity that have 
been invoked by the various Justices when reaching their various conclusions about capital 
punishment. For example, Justices Brennan and Kennedy have tended to focus on the “human 
dignity” of the offender;10 Justice Marshall has considered the implications of capital punishment 
for communitarian dignity;11 and Justice Powell and Chief Justice Roberts have raised concerns 
with the dignity of the legal institution.12 Even within each group, there is disagreement. 
Brennan considered capital punishment to always be violative of the offender’s innate human 
9 Leslie Meltzner Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169 (2011); Maxine D. Goodman, Human 
Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740 (2006); THE CONSTITUTION OF 
RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES (Michael J. Meyer and William .A. Parent eds., 1992). 
10 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Brennan J. concurring in judgment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 
(2005) 
11 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (Marshall J. concurring in judgment) 
12 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 57 (2008) 
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dignity, whereas Kennedy has tied dignity to moral virtue, and has concluded that capital 
punishment can be consistent with respect for the dignity of the offender.13 
Whatever one’s view on the normativity and constitutionality of the death penalty, it is 
clear that the Justices have been speaking past one another on this issue. This is partly because 
the different Justices have adopted different approaches to interpreting the Eighth Amendment, 
and partly because dignity is a vague concept in moral discourses and is open to a multitude of 
definitions. If philosophers have long struggled to ascribe meaning to dignity,14 it is perhaps 
inevitable that the Court has also struggled. It follows that to make sense and to critique the 
various judicial invocations of dignity, we need to address the idea of dignity in the philosophical 
literature. This is undertaken in Part III. Indeed, just as philosophical approaches to dignity can 
help explain and assess judicial uses of the term, so too can legal understandings of dignity be 
used to shed light on dignity as a concept in moral philosophy.15 There is also a normative reason 
for exploring the philosophical accounts of dignity through the lens of local legal culture. It is 
unwise to impose moral philosophy on a community without due regard of local circumstances,16 
and therefore in Part III we will consider each of the Court’s uses of dignity in turn. That is, the 
works of philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, Louis Pojman,17 Robert Johnson,18 and others are 
13 See Part II infra 
14 See Part III infra 
15 See, for example, Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights – The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 
(University of California, Berkeley, 21-23 April 2009), at 209 (“Dignity seems at home in law. Let us begin by 
analyzing how it works in its native habitat, and see whether the jurisprudence of dignity can cast any light on its use 
in moral discourse.”) 
16 For an attempt to use existing America practices and institutions to construct a theory of American public 
philosophy, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 
(1998). Also see Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN L. REV. 933, 993 (2016) (“a philosophical 
theory without roots in the culture will not do.”) 
17 Louis Pojman, Why the Death Penalty is Morally Permissible, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY: SHOULD 
AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? - THE EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES MAKE THEIR BEST CASE (Hugo Adam 
Bedau and Paul G Cassell eds., 2004) 
18 Robert Johnson, Reflections on the Death Penalty: Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Dehumanization in the 
Death House, 13 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 583 (2015). 
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used to get to grips with the Court’s approaches to human dignity, communitarian dignity, and 
institutional dignity. While it might be tempting to seek to defend one of the particular existing 
judicial approaches to dignity, it is argued instead that all three conceptions of dignity are 
important and relevant to determinations of the constitutionality of capital punishment. However, 
each conception by itself is insufficient. It is argued that these dignities inter-relate and inform 
one another, and thus need to be considered holistically. For example, we cannot understand 
whether the dignity of the institution has been respected without understanding whether the 
human dignities of the people involved in the institution have been respected. When the three 
dignities are considered together, we can better understand how and why dignity must not be 
conflated with other values such as moral virtue (as Justice Kennedy has done), must not be 
subject to popular opinion (as the Court has tended to do), and provides the framework for 
finding capital punishment to be contrary to the Eighth Amendment prohibition on “cruel and 
unusual punishments.” 
 
I. DIGNITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY WORLDWIDE 
The term dignity has been invoked by a number of legal authorities when explaining why the 
death penalty should be abolished. In international law, the Preamble to the Second Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which outlaws capital 
punishment in all circumstances, states that the “abolition of the death penalty contributes to 
enhancement of human dignity and progressive development of human rights.”19 Countries 
19 It should be noted that, in the past, treaties of international human rights law suggested that capital punishment is 
compatible with respect for dignity. For example, the Preamble to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights reads: “These rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person”, yet Article 6 of this treaty 
tolerates capital punishment. However, over the years international human rights law has moved towards advocating 
the abolition of the death penalty on the grounds that such a punishment is not compatible with a commitment to 
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around the world have adopted a similar position. In 1990, the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
tied the constitutional right to life to the concept of human dignity when ruling that “capital 
punishment resulted not merely in a limitation upon that right but in fact the complete and 
irreversible elimination of life and dignity.”20 In a wide-ranging consideration of the 
constitutionality of the death penalty in South Africa, the South African Constitutional Court 
outlawed capital punishment in the 1994 case of State v. Makwanyane on the grounds that it 
violated, inter alia, the convicted person’s constitutional right to dignity.21 The death penalty, 
Justice Chaskalson wrote, “annihilates human dignity”22 because it “objectif[ies] murderers [by] 
putting them to death to serve as an example to others…”23 
In a case involving the extradition of a person to face capital charges abroad, the Supreme 
Court of Canada also asserted that respect for human dignity pulls towards the abolition of 
capital punishment. In Kindler v. Canada, three of the seven judges stated that the death penalty 
is “the supreme indignity to the individual, the ultimate corporal punishment, the final and 
complete lobotomy and the absolute and irrevocable castration. [It is] the ultimate desecration of 
human dignity.”24 Three other judges referred to “the serious invasion of human dignity [that the 
death penalty] engenders”.25 More recently, in August 2015, the Law Commission of India 
protect and respect human dignity. See ROGER HOOD AND CAROLYN HOYLE, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLDWIDE 
PERSPECTIVE (2015) Chapter 1 
20 Alkotmhnybirshg [Hungarian Constitutional Court], Dec. No. 23/1990 (X.3 1) AB (Oct. 24, 1990), translated in 1 
E. EUR. CASE REP. CONST. L 177 (1994)  
21 State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
22 State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391, [95] (CC) (S. Afr.). 
23 State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391, [144] (CC) (S. Afr.). 
24 Kindler v. Canada, (1991) S.C.R. 779, 241 (per Cory, J, dissenting with Lamer, CJC, concurring). See also, 
Sopinka, J, dissenting (with Lamer, CJC, concurring) at 220. 
25 Kindler v. Canada, (1991) S.C.R. 779, 202 (per La Forest, J)(L’Heureux-Dube and Gonthier, JJ concurring) 
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issued a report on the death penalty that recommended the abolition of capital punishment 
because of “prevailing standards of constitutional morality and human dignity”.26  
 From the above, we can tentatively set out why some legal authorities have considered 
the death penalty to be incompatible with respect for the dignity of the offender. Dignity, 
according to these authorities, demands that human beings are not objectified, but the death 
penalty involves putting people to death as a means for deterring others from committing crimes. 
Also, as the “complete lobotomy”, the death penalty does not comport with respect for dignity 
because it involves removing a person’s capacity to determine how they live their own life.  
 These authorities have felt enabled to ground their approaches to the death penalty within 
discourses of dignity largely because dignity is central to these legal orders.27 In contrast, the 
term dignity does not appear in the text of the US Constitution, and the idea of dignity has 
historically been absent from US constitutional, legal, and political traditions. James Whitman 
has argued that the absence of dignity as a controlling constitutional value has fueled an 
American propensity to treat criminals without respect for their dignity precisely because of their 
criminality.28 To explain this, Whitman notes that the word “dignity” derives from the Latin 
26 Law Commission of India, Report No. 262 The Death Penalty, August 2015 p.217. It should be noted, though, 
that the Supreme Court of India has suggested that the death penalty is compatible with respect for human dignity. 
See Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684, at para 209 (“A real and abiding concern for the dignity of 
human life postulates resistance to taking a life through law’s instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in the 
rarest of rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed.”)  
27 For example, Article 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa reads: “The Republic of South Africa is 
one, sovereign, democratic state founded on the following values: (a) Human dignity, the achievement of equality 
and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.” Article 10 also protects a right to dignity: “Everyone has 
inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.” Article 54(1) of the Constitution of 
Hungary reads: “In the Republic of Hungary every human being has the innate right to life and the dignity of man.” 
The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany is also notorious for explicitly protecting human dignity: “The 
dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all public authority.” (Article 1 Basic Law) 
Also see, for example, Matthias Mahlmann, The Basic Law at 60 - Human Dignity and the Culture of 
Republicanism, 11 German L.J. 9 (2010);  
28 JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA 
AND EUROPE (2d ed. 2005). Also see Jonathan Simon, Dignity and Risk: The Long Road from Graham v. Florida to 
Abolition of Life without Parole, in LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AMERICA’S NEW DEATH PENALTY? (Charles J. Ogletree 
Jr and Austin Sarat eds., 2012). Alexander Reinert has noted that the Court’s invocation of dignity in cases involving 
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“dignitas”, which referred to the honor and worthiness of high-ranking officials in ancient Rome, 
such as Senators and other noblemen.29 The social status of these people demanded that they be 
treated with a particular level of respect. For many years, aristocrats found guilty of criminal 
offences were therefore subjected to milder punishments than their non-aristocratic counterparts. 
Over time, particularly during the Enlightenment era, communities across Europe came to 
believe that everybody should be treated with respect for their worthiness, and the levels of 
punishments were raised so that all persons were subjected to milder and more humane 
punishments than had previously been the case. America, though, has never recognized the 
concept of aristocracy. This is made clear by Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution: “No Title of 
Nobility shall be granted by the United States.” Instead, historically the main differences in 
social rank in American communities were between slaves and free persons, and the punishment 
of criminals was therefore aligned with the harsh and degrading treatment of slaves,30 in order to 
reflect their lower social standing. To compound this, when slavery was abolished, slaves were 
not “elevated” to the social status enjoyed by free persons. Instead, black people were 
increasingly criminalized, and thus subjected to punishments such as incarceration and the death 
penalty.31 Indeed, even though the Thirteenth Amendment banned slavery, it explicitly permitted 
slavery as punishment for crime, and many black people found themselves re-enslaved as a 
the treatment of prisoners generally is problematic: “To the extent that the modern Supreme Court aligns its Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence with respect for human dignity, the Court should appreciate how shallow that conception 
is in operation. Indeed, there is ample evidence that, despite the promise of judicial regulation of prisoners’ 
treatment, courts often fall short of guaranteeing minimum standards of decency in prisons and jails even after years 
of judicial intervention.” (Alexander A. Reinert, Reconceptualizing the Eighth Amendment: Slaves, Prisoners, and 
“Cruel and Unusual” Punishment 94 N. C. L. REV 817, 825 (2016)) 
29 Jeremy Waldron, Citizenship and Dignity, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY (Christopher McCrudden (ed) 
192 Proceedings of the British Academy 2013) 327 
30 JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL & UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT (2012); Alexander A. Reinert, Reconceptualizing the Eighth Amendment: Slaves, Prisoners, and 
“Cruel and Unusual” Punishment 94 N. C. L. REV 817 (2016)) 
31 DAVID M. OSHINSKY, “WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW 
JUSTICE (1996); DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK 
AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (2009). 
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result. All of this had the effect of tying the treatment of prisoners with the now historical 
treatment of slaves: as if they were sub-human. This set in motion the historical trend in the US 
towards the degrading and undignified treatment of criminals, and in part explains why the US 
today imposes punishments such as the death penalty that have been rejected by other liberal 
democracies. Describing the differences between European and American approaches to 
punishment generally as a “great divergence”, Joshua Kleinfeld writes: “The story of capital 
punishment is the story of the great divergence writ small, and it has something to teach us about 
the great divergence writ large.”32 
For some jurists and commentators, the absence of the term dignity from the text of the 
US Constitution precludes the Supreme Court from considering dignity at all in constitutional 
interpretation.33 Notwithstanding these views, and despite Whitman’s observations that dignity 
has been absent from political and public debates about punishment, the Court has long accepted 
the position that “the principles of human dignity … are embodied in the Constitution”,34 and 
that “human dignity remains in the background [of US law] as a value justifying the set of 
human rights, [even though it] does not operate as an applicable legal rule at all.”35 While the 
Court has invoked the term dignity in a number of constitutional contexts,36 it is particularly 
32 Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN L. REV. 933, 991 (2016) 
33 Justice Thomas has criticized his colleagues for referring to dignity in a case concerning the constitutionality of 
state-wide prohibitions on same-sex marriage: “[T]he majority goes to great lengths to assert that its decision will 
advance the “dignity” of same-sex couples… The flaw in that reasoning, of course, is that the Constitution contains 
no “dignity” Clause.” (Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __ (2015) (slip op. Thomas J. dissenting at 16)). Also see 
Raoul Berger, Justice Brennan, “Human Dignity,” and Constitutional Interpretation, in THE CONSTITUTION OF 
RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES (Michael J. Meyer and William A. Parent eds., 1992) p.134 
(“Respect for ‘human dignity’ clearly is spun out of thin air; it is an evangelistic exhortation rather than a 
constitutional mandate.”) 
34 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Three Questions for America’ N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 2006, at 24, 26.  
35 Gerald Neuman, Discourses of Dignity, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013) 
at 640  
36 Leslie Meltzner Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 169 (2011) In her empirical study of the 
Court’s invocation of dignity, Henry asserts that the Court has used the word dignity in over 900 opinions over the 
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relevant to the Eighth Amendment.37 This much was made clear in Trop v. Dulles, decided in 
1958, when Chief Justice Warren asserted that “The basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the 
Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized 
standards.”38 Warren explained that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”39 It was affirmed 
that punishments would be unconstitutionally cruel—in other words, contrary to human 
dignity—if they were disproportionately severe when compared to the gravity of the crime in 
question.  
The Court has repeatedly endorsed Trop, with Justice Kennedy recently asserting that 
“Evolving standards of decency must embrace and express respect for the dignity of the person, 
and the punishment of criminals must conform to that rule.”40 However, ever since Trop was 
decided, the Justices have struggled to define what they mean by human dignity, and they have 
struggled to devise a methodology for determining which punishments contravene “evolving 
standards of decency.”41 This has led to differing attitudes within the Court over the relationship 
between dignity and the death penalty.  
 
course of 220 years. There has been a particular focus on “human dignity” since that term first appeared in an 
opinion in 1946. 
37 Shannon D. Gilreath, Cruel and Unusual Punishment and the Eighth Amendment as a Mandate for Human 
Dignity: Another Look at Original Intent, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV 559 (2003) [others] 
38 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion) 
39 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958) (plurality opinion) 
40 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008) 
41  For a thorough account of the history of the Eighth Amendment and the death penalty, see JOHN D. BESSLER, 
CRUEL & UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT (2012)  
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II. THE US SUPREME COURT’S USE OF DIGNITY IN ITS DEATH PENALTY 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Although the Court in Trop referred to the dignity of the individual person—in other words, 
“human dignity”—a number of Justices have invoked other conceptions of dignity. We will first 
see how Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that the death penalty is always violative of 
human and communitarian dignity respectively, and we will then explore four ways in which the 
Court has used human and institutional dignity to uphold and entrench the constitutionality of 
capital punishment.  
A. Reading Dignity to Require the Abolition of Capital Punishment 
In Furman v. Georgia, decided in 1972, Justice Brennan asserted that “the deliberate 
extinguishment of human life by the State is uniquely degrading to human dignity.”42 Brennan 
explains why: “The true significance of these punishments is that they treat members of the 
human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded. They are thus inconsistent 
with the fundamental premise of the [Eighth Amendment] that even the vilest criminal remains a 
human being possessed of common human dignity.”43  
 In addition to stating that the death penalty in the abstract contravenes the dignity of the 
offender, Brennan notes that capital punishment as practiced at the time was also violative of 
human dignity: “there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by 
contemporary society is virtually total; and there is no reason to believe that it serves any penal 
purpose more effectively than the less severe punishment of imprisonment. The function of these 
principles is to enable a court to determine whether a punishment comports with human dignity. 
42 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 291 (1972) 
43 Furman, 408 U.S. at 272-273. For an account of Justice Brennan’s approach to dignity in constitutional 
interpretation generally, see Stephen Wermiel, Law and Human Dignity: The Judicial Soul of Justice Brennan, 7 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS L. 223 (1998).   
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Death, quite simply, does not.”44 Brennan is clear, though, that the deontological ground for 
holding capital punishment unconstitutional is central to his opinion, since in his view the 
Constitution is premised on the protection of human dignity: “The country has debated whether a 
society for which the dignity of the individual is the supreme value can, without a fundamental 
inconsistency, follow the practice of deliberately putting some of its members to death. In the 
United States… the struggle about this punishment has been one between ancient and deeply 
rooted beliefs in retribution, atonement or vengeance, on the one hand, and, on the other, beliefs 
in the personal value and dignity of the common man”.45  
In the same case, Justice Marshall offered another reason for holding that the death 
penalty is contrary to respect for dignity. For Marshall, “the Eighth Amendment is our insulation 
from our baser selves.”46 It follows that a community that imposes an excessive punishment 
debases itself, and since the death penalty is always unnecessary in his view, it is excessive and 
thus unconstitutional. Thus, Marshall is not so much concerned with the dignity of the offender, 
as he is with the dignity of the wider community.  
Marshall also differs from Brennan in that he believes that the content of dignity is to be 
defined by the people, rather than by the courts: “In judging whether or not a given penalty is 
morally acceptable, most courts have said that the punishment is valid unless “it shocks the 
conscience and sense of justice of the people.””47 This is not to say that public opinion dictates 
the determination of whether or not a punishment is “cruel and unusual”, though. Marshall 
makes it clear that in his role as a justice of the Supreme Court, he must test the premises on 
which public opinion is based. He opines that most Americans would find capital punishment to 
44 Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 
45 Furman, 408 U.S. at 296 
46 Furman, 408 U.S. at 345 
47 Furman, 408 U.S. at 360 (citations omitted) 
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be shocking, and thus degrading to their sense of dignity, if they had detailed knowledge of how 
it fails to deter offenders and is applied disproportionately on the basis of race and poverty.48  
Justice Marshall comes close to recognizing the multi-faceted nature of dignity when he 
ends his judgment with the words: “In recognizing the humanity of our fellow beings, we pay 
ourselves the highest tribute.”49 That is, he recognizes that the dignity of the offender is bound 
up with the dignity of the community. As explained below,50 this is an important step to 
understanding why the concept of dignity pulls towards abolition, but unfortunately Marshall did 
not elaborate on this point. In any event, the other three Justices who decided in favor of Furman 
based their opinions on the narrower ground that the administration of the death penalty, and not 
the death penalty per se, was unconstitutional.51 Since the opinions of Brennan and Marshall 
were not controlling, the majority of states responded to Furman by drafting new statutes that 
purported to address the concerns of the plurality. Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia,52 the 
Court held that the new statutes would eliminate the arbitrariness and discrimination that had 
characterized the pre-Furman death penalty, and capital punishment was therefore reinstated. 
Moreover, since Gregg was decided, no other Justice has said that respect for human or 
communitarian dignity requires the abolition of capital punishment,53 and dignity has instead 
done more to sustain the death penalty than to pull towards abolition.  
48 Furman, 408 U.S. at 361-2. The notion that an informed citizenry would reject the death penalty has come to be 
known as “The Marshall Hypothesis”. See Carol S. Steiker, The Marshall Hypothesis Revisited, 52 HOWARD L.J. 
525 (2009); Austin Sarat and Neil Vidmar, Public Opinion, the Death Penalty, and the Eighth Amendment: Testing 
the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 171 (1976); Enekwa, C. Crystal, Capital Punishment and the Marshall 
Hypothesis: Reforming a Broken System of Punishment, 80 TENN. L. REV. 411 (2013). 
49 Furman, 408 U.S. at 371 
50 See Part III.B infra  
51 Justices Stewart, White, and Douglass issued separate but concurring opinions, agreeing that the death penalty 
was unconstitutional because it was arbitrarily imposed.  
52 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) 
53 Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Breyer (joined by Ginsburg) have all opined that the death penalty is 
unconstitutional, but have not based their opinion on the contention that capital punishment is fundamentally 
incompatible with respect for human dignity. See Part II.B.4 infra  
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B. Reading Dignity to Justify the Constitutionality of Capital Punishment 
There are four ways in which the Court has used dignity to justify the constitutionality of capital 
punishment. First, some Justices have said that respect for the dignity of the victim either 
demands capital punishment, or at least justifies states’ retention and use of the death penalty. If 
this can be described as an “active” use of dignity to uphold capital punishment, then the 
remaining three uses have been more passive. The second way in which dignity has been used 
passively to justify capital punishment can be found in the Court’s attempts to narrow the scope 
of capital punishment so that it is only imposed on the “worst of the worst” offenders. By using 
dignity to justify the exclusion of certain people from capital punishment, the Court has implied 
that capital punishment is compatible with respect for the dignity of the “worst of the worst”, or 
that such people have somehow forfeited their dignity, or their right to have their dignity 
respected. Third, some Justices have used a concern with respecting the dignity, or integrity, of 
the legal system in order to decide in favor of the states that use the death penalty. Fourth, with 
the exception of Justices Brennan and Marshall, the term dignity has conversely not been 
invoked at all by the Justices who have called for a reconsideration of the constitutionality of 
capital punishment. The net result of this is that the term dignity is absent from abolitionist 
discourses, but is present in retentionist discourses on the Court. Let us consider these four pro-
death penalty uses of dignity in turn. 
1. The dignity of the victim justifies, if not requires, capital punishment 
In Furman and Gregg, some Justices suggested that respect for the dignity of the victim actually 
justifies, if not requires, capital punishment. Dissenting in Furman, Justice Powell stated that the 
crime of rape is “the most atrocious of intrusions upon the privacy and dignity of the victim”,54 
54 Furman, 408 U.S. at 458 (Powell J. dissenting) 
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and thus the death penalty for rape is constitutional. This approach was reiterated in Gregg, when 
Justice Stewart wrote: “the decision that capital punishment may be the appropriate sanction in 
extreme cases is an expression of the community’s belief that certain crimes are themselves so 
grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.”55  
Importantly, in Gregg v. Georgia, Justice Stewart offered an approach to interpreting the 
Eighth Amendment which has since paved the way for public opinion to supersede judicial 
considerations of dignity in Eighth Amendment analysis. Stewart stated that “evolving standards 
of decency” are best determined with reference to “objective indicia that reflect the public 
attitude toward a given sanction.”56 He asserted that the primary “objective indicia” of 
contemporary standards are state legislative judgments and the decisions of juries, since these 
reflect “the moral values of the people”,57 and are a “reliable objective index of contemporary 
values”.58 Stewart made it clear that public opinion was not decisive of the question, though. He 
noted that “our cases also make clear that public perceptions of standards of decency . . . are not 
conclusive. A penalty must also accord with ‘the dignity of man,’ which is the ‘basic concept 
underlying the Eighth Amendment. This means, at least, that the punishment not be 
‘excessive’”.59 In this respect, the Court indicated that it would apply its own determination on 
whether or not a punishment is disproportionate. The Court emphasized that although the views 
of state legislatures would be taken into account when making such a determination, such 
legislation would not necessarily be determinative of the issue because the “Eighth Amendment 
55 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184 (citations omitted)  
56 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 
57 Id. at 175 (emphasis added) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 383 (1972) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting)). 
58 id., at 181. 
59 id., at 173 
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is a restraint upon the exercise of legislative power.”60 Therefore, judicially-determined 
conceptions of human dignity were to act as a check against the will of the populace. However, 
as explained in the next section, the Court has subsequently given greater prominence to “public 
attitudes” when interpreting the Eighth Amendment, effectively delegating determinations of 
standards of decency to the public. This has resulted in equating “respect for dignity” with 
“respect for public opinion.” 
2. The death penalty is compatible with respect for dignity in limited circumstances 
The Court’s post-Gregg jurisprudence provides a second way in which dignity has been used to 
sustain capital punishment. On the same day that Gregg was decided, the Court also handed 
down judgment in Woodson v. North Carolina,61 in which the majority said that respect for 
human dignity prohibits mandatory death penalty schemes because they preclude consideration 
of the defendant’s moral culpability. In the Court’s words: “The respect for human dignity 
underlying the Eighth Amendment… requires consideration of aspects of the character of the 
individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally 
indispensable part of the process of imposing the ultimate punishment of death. The North 
Carolina statute impermissibly treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as 
uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be 
subjected to the blind infliction of the death penalty.”62  
The implication of Woodson is that the death penalty is only violative of human dignity if 
a person is executed without first being treated as a unique individual. That is, contrary to 
60 id., at 174 
61 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
62 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 281 (1976). This approach has been taken in other jurisdictions too. 
For example, the High Court of Lagos State, in Nigeria, has held: “the prescription of mandatory death penalty for 
offences such as armed robbery and murder contravenes the right of the applicants to dignity of human person…” 
James Ajulu & Others v. Attorney General of Lagos, Suit No. ID/76M/2008, October 2012. 
16 
 
                                                 
DRAFT COPY: 
An edited version of this paper will be published in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 
2 (forthcoming 2016). 
 
Brennan’s view, a person can still be treated as a human being when being sentenced and put to 
death. The next year, the Court continued with its attempts to define the constitutionally 
permissible scope of capital punishment. In Coker v. Georgia,63 the Court outlawed the death 
penalty for rapes that do not result in death, but in doing so began the process of removing 
judicial understandings of dignity from the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. The Court 
asserted that “Eighth Amendment judgments should not be, or appear to be, merely the 
subjective views of individual justices; judgment should be informed by objective factors to the 
maximum possible extent.”64 Thus, it became clear that public attitudes to the death penalty were 
to override any judicial determination of whether or not capital punishment in any particular case 
was disproportionate and thus incompatible with human dignity. As if to underscore this point, 
the Coker Court did not mention the word “dignity” at all in its judgment.65  
During the 1980s, the Court continued to step away from explicit considerations of 
dignity in its death penalty jurisprudence, particularly when considering the constitutionality of 
the death penalty as a substantive punishment for certain crimes, or on certain groups of people 
such as young offenders. In Enmund v Florida (1982), Thompson v Oklahoma (1988), Penry v 
Lynaugh (1989) and Stanford v Kentucky (1989), the Court did not refer to “dignity” at all, and 
instead relied primarily on “objective indicia” to determine what public opinion said about the 
imposition of the death penalty in various circumstances.66 In upholding the death penalty for 
16- and 17-year-old offenders in Stanford, Justice Scalia expressly eschewed proportionality 
analysis and based his finding on the fact that the Framers permitted such a punishment, and that 
63 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) 
64 Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (emphasis added). 
65 It should be noted that Justices Brennan and Marshall repeatedly issued dissents calling for the outright abolition 
of the death penalty, and repeatedly invoked the term “dignity” in these dissents. See, for example, Glass v. 
Louisiana¸ 471 U.S. 1080 (1985) 
66 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 
U.S. 302 (1989); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) 
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the majority of states with the death penalty permitted such punishment.67 In this sense, Scalia 
suggested that judicially-determined conceptions of dignity have no role to play in the Court’s 
analysis, and that wide discretion is to be granted to the states as to the substantive scope of 
capital punishment. It is in this sense that concerns with “human dignity” were subsumed under 
concerns for respecting public opinion. 
In recent years, the Court has reconfigured its approach to the Eighth Amendment, and 
has used judicially-determined conceptions of dignity to impose further limits on the death 
penalty. In Atkins v. Virginia,68 decided in 2002, the Court showed greater willingness to refer to 
the evidence of relevant experts,69 and the opinion of the international community,70 to help with 
its own determination of whether the death penalty was disproportionate and thus 
unconstitutional when imposed on persons suffering from “mental retardation.”71 Although the 
Court did not expressly use the word dignity in Atkins, the term has been invoked in later cases 
with a remarkable degree of regularity. In outlawing the death penalty for juvenile offenders in 
Roper v. Simmons in 2005, Justice Kennedy noted that “[b]y protecting even those convicted of 
heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the 
dignity of all persons.”72 In this case, Kennedy still gave primacy to public opinion as expressed 
in state legislation and the decisions of juries, but went on to make explicit and considerable 
reference to relevant experts in child psychology and neuroscience,73 and the laws and practices 
of other countries to help affirm the reasonableness of his finding that the death penalty for 
67 Stanford, 492 U.S. at 368-379 
68 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 
69 In this case, experts on “mental retardation”. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317-321 
70 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316, n.21 
71 The Court has since eschewed this term in favor of the less-offensive “intellectually disabled”. See Hall v. Florida, 
134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) 
72 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) 
73 Roper, 543 U.S. 568-575 
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juvenile offenders is disproportionate and contravenes the constitutional requirement to respect 
human dignity.74  
Writing in 2006 about the Court’s deference to public opinion, Maxine Goodman states 
that that “while the Court expresses an unwavering commitment to advancing human dignity in 
these cases, the Court’s analysis of human dignity in most death penalty cases is weak and 
meaningless.”75 This is because the Court has largely equated respect for human dignity with 
respect for public opinion. However, in later judgments, Justice Kennedy has omitted reference 
to the Coker doctrine that Eighth Amendment judgments should “be informed by objective 
factors to the maximum possible extent”,76 and has opened the door to non-populist 
understandings of dignity. In outlawing the death penalty for the non-fatal rape of a child in 
Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008), for example, Kennedy asserted that “Evolving standards of 
decency must embrace and express respect for the dignity of the person, and the punishment of 
criminals must conform to that rule.”77 Put another way, the Eighth Amendment, and the 
definition of “human dignity”, is not to be informed by the actions of state legislatures, but rather 
the “dignity of the person” must inform legislative approaches to the punishment of criminals. 
Further, in reiterating in Hall v. Florida in 2014 that it is unconstitutional to impose the death 
penalty on the intellectually disabled, Kennedy wrote: “No legitimate penological purpose is 
served by executing a person with intellectual disability. To do so contravenes the Eighth 
Amendment for to impose the harshest of punishments on an intellectually disabled person 
74 Roper, 543 U.S. 575-578 
75 Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 772-
772 (2006) (internal references omitted) 
76 Coker, 433 U.S. at 592. Also see Susan Raeker-Jordan Kennedy, Kennedy, and the Eighth Amendment: “Still in 
Search of a Unifying Principle”? 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 107 (2011). 
77 Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 420 
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violates his or her inherent dignity as a human being.”78 This opinion built on Justice Marshall’s 
reasoning in Ford v. Wainwright, decided in 1986, outlawing the death penalty for persons 
suffering from insanity: “Whether its aim be to protect the condemned from fear and pain 
without comfort of understanding, or to protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of 
exacting mindless vengeance, the restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth Amendment.”79  
For some, the increasing limitations that the Court has placed on the scope of capital 
punishment suggests that the US is moving towards outright abolition of the death penalty, and it 
would follow that the idea of dignity in these cases has been used to foster abolition.80 However, 
it could also be said that these cases suggest that either the death penalty is compatible with 
respect for the dignity of the morally reprehensible, or that the morally reprehensible have 
forfeited any claim to have their dignity respected.81 Given that the Court has repeatedly 
affirmed that even those convicted of criminal offences retain their dignity,82 we must conclude 
that the Court uses dignity as part of its balancing exercise when determining whether or not the 
death penalty is disproportionate in any given circumstance.83 It is in this sense, then, that dignity 
has worked to legitimize the imposition of the death penalty, at least in those cases where the 
78 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (internal references omitted) 
79 Ford v Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) 
80 Charlie Eastaugh, Capital Punishment: An Institution Vanishing Through the Evolution of the Eighth Amendment 
3 WESTMINSTER LAW REVIEW 23 (2014); Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker, The Beginning of the End? in THE ROAD 
TO ABOLITION? THE FUTURE OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr and Austin 
Sarat eds., 2009) (“…the prospects for judicial abolition of the death penalty have increased enormously since the 
late 1990s. Recent Eighth Amendment decisions have substantially altered the Court’s proportionality doctrine, and 
the newly emerging approach is more hospitable to a global assault against the death penalty than the relatively 
deferential framework that it replaced.” p.101) 
81 The US is not the only jurisdiction in which it has been held that respect for dignity merely requires the regulation 
of capital punishment. The Supreme Court of India has held: “A real and abiding concern for the dignity of human 
life postulates resistance to taking a life through law’s instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in the rarest of 
rare cases when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed.” Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 
684, at para 209. 
82 See, for example, Roper, 543 U.S. at 560: “By protecting even those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth 
Amendment reaffirms the duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons.” 
83 On human dignity in proportionality analysis, see Mattias Kumm and Alec D. Walen, Human Dignity and 
Proportionality : Deontic Pluralism in Balancing, in PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW : RIGHTS, 
JUSTIFICATION, REASONING (Grant Huscroft et al. eds., 2014). 
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offender is morally culpable of committing a particularly heinous crime that results in death. 
Indeed, when the Court upheld certain lethal injection procedures in the 2015 case of Glossip v 
Gross, Justice Alito expressly used the dignity of the person facing death to give the execution a 
veneer of acceptability. In describing the background to the case, Alito noted how, in the 
previous execution of Clayton Lockett, the execution team had “covered the injection access 
point with a sheet, in part to preserve Lockett’s dignity during the execution.”84 This gives the 
impression that the authorities and the Court paid due respect to the dignity of the person being 
executed, thus legitimizing the execution. We have already seen, though, that respect for human 
dignity requires more than the mere covering up of the physical point of execution, and it would 
appear that Justice Alito was instead betraying a concern with maintaining the appearance of a 
dignified process. Indeed, as we will now see, concerns with “institutional” dignity have also led 
some Justices to decide in favor of the states administering capital punishment. 
3. The dignity of the institution takes priority over the dignity of the person 
A third way in which dignity has been used to sustain capital punishment can be found in the 
opinions of Justice Powell in McCleskey v. Kemp in 1987,85 and Chief Justice Roberts in Baze v. 
Rees in 2008.86 In McCleskey, Justice Powell accepted the validity of statistical evidence relating 
to racial discrimination in the application of the death penalty, but refused to use that evidence to 
strike down the death penalty because of the damage that such a decision would bring to the 
criminal justice system as a whole: “McCleskey’s claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws 
into serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system. The Eighth 
Amendment is not limited in application to capital punishment, but applies to all penalties. Thus, 
84 Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. ___ (2015) (slip op. 7) 
85 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) 
86 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) 
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if we accepted McCleskey’s claim that racial bias has impermissibly tainted the capital 
sentencing decision, we could soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty.”87 
Concerns with the appearance of the dignity of the institution, then, overrode concerns with the 
dignity of Warren McCleskey, who had most likely been sentenced to die because of the color of 
his skin, rather than because of his crime and moral culpability.88 In focusing on the integrity of 
the institution, Powell entrenched the constitutionality of capital punishment. Similarly, in 
upholding the constitutionality of Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol in Baze v. Rees, Roberts 
placed emphasis on the need to respect the “dignity of the procedure”,89 expressing reluctance to 
interfere with a method of execution that has a dignified appearance. Roberts did not refer at all 
to the dignity of the person being executed, and it would appear that a dignified procedure is, in 
his view, either inherently respectful of the inmate’s dignity, or supersedes the need to respect 
the inmate’s dignity.90 Both McCleskey and Baze have been described as the two post-Furman 
cases that could have conceivably brought a halt to the death penalty altogether,91 and we can see 
therefore how the choice to focus on a particular conception of dignity over another—in this 
87 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315    
88 JEFFREY L. KIRCHMEIER, IMPRISONED BY THE PAST: WARREN MCCLESKEY AND THE AMERICAN DEATH 
PENALTY (2015); Christopher Bracey, Dignity in Race Jurisprudence, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L 669, 671 (2005). (“The 
struggle for racial justice in America, then, is perhaps best understood as a struggle to secure dignity in the face of 
sustained efforts to degrade and dishonor persons on the basis of color”) 
89 Baze, 553 U.S. at 57.  
90 Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, The Death of Dignity, in IS THE DEATH PENALTY DYING? EUROPEAN AND 
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 204 (Austin Sarat and Jürgen Martschukat eds., 2011). For the view that lethal injections 
respect the human dignity of the inmate, see JOSEPH B.R. GAIE, THE ETHICS OF MEDICAL INVOLVEMENT IN CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL DISCUSSION (2004) (“The service of the execution by the medical doctor enhances 
the prisoners’ human dignity, or at least it reduces the indignities, experienced in other methods of execution” at 
p.95) 
91 John Bessler has described McCleskey and Baze as the two “systemic challenges” to the death penalty since 
Furman and Gregg. See John D. Bessler, The American Enlightenment: Eliminating Capital Punishment in the 
United States, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A HAZARD TO A SUSTAINABLE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM? (Lill Scherdin 
ed., 2014) p.95. This is because a ruling in favor of petitioners in either case would have halted the death penalty, at 
least temporarily. 
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case, the dignity of the institution over and above the dignity of the inmate—can lead to the 
strengthening of death penalty systems. 
4. Dignity-free abolitionist opinions 
A fourth way in which dignity has sustained capital punishment can be found in the opinions of 
Justice Blackmun in Callins v. Collins,92 Justice Stevens in Baze v. Rees,93 and Justice Breyer in 
Glossip v. Gross.94 In these opinions, the Justices called on their colleagues to reconsider the 
constitutionality of capital punishment, but none went as far as Justices Brennan and Marshall in 
their reasoning. Rather than assert that capital punishment is always contrary to respect for 
human dignity or the dignity of the community, these three Justices instead focused on the 
practical problems with the administration of the death penalty.95 Having said this, a close 
reading of their opinions reveals that all three had concerns that are rooted in the idea of dignity. 
For example, Justice Blackmun emphasized that respect for humanity required individualized 
sentencing, which in his experience always bred arbitrariness in the administration of capital 
punishment. Given the importance of respecting the humanity of the individual facing death, 
Blackmun concluded that the death penalty can never work in a constitutionally-acceptable 
manner.96 Similarly, Justice Breyer expressed concern with the anguish felt by those who spend 
an inordinate amount of time on death row awaiting execution.97 However, it is notable that none 
of these Justices expressly used the word dignity in their opinions. Given that, in Baze, Roberts 
92 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (Blackmun J. dissenting from denial of cert.) 
93 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (Stevens J. concurring in part) 
94 Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. ___ (2015) (Breyer J. dissenting) (joined by Ginbsurg J.) 
95 Dwight Aarons, The Marshall Hypothesis and the Rise of Anti-Death Penalty Judges, 80 TENN. L. REV. 381, 396-
409 (2013)  
96 Callins, 510 U.S. at 1144 (Blackmun J. dissenting from denial of cert.) (“Experience has taught us that the 
constitutional goal of eliminating arbitrariness and discrimination from the administration of death… can never be 
achieved without compromising an equally essential component of fundamental fairness—individualized 
sentencing.”) 
97 Glossip, 576 U.S. at 19 (slip op. Breyer J. dissenting) (“a lengthy delay in and of itself is especially cruel because 
it “subjects death row inmates to decades of especially severe, dehumanizing conditions of confinement.”” (Quoting 
Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U. S. 1067, 1069 (2009) (Stevens, J., statement respecting denial of certiorari).  
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expressly used the word dignity when holding in favor of the state administering capital 
punishment, it is arguable that the failure of Stevens to invoke dignity in that same case means 
that dignity features more prominently in retentionist opinions, than in abolitionist opinions. 
Thus, dignity has been used to legitimate the death penalty, rather than to justify or demand its 
abolition.  
C. Evaluating the Court’s Uses of Dignity in its Death Penalty Jurisprudence 
From the preceding account, we can identify three conceptions of dignity in the Court’s death 
penalty jurisprudence. Justices Brennan, Powell, and Kennedy have authored opinions that focus 
on the “human dignity” of the offender and victim; Justices Marshall and Kennedy have invoked 
the dignity of the community; and Justice Powell and Chief Justice Roberts have paid more 
attention to the dignity of the institution. Moreover, different justices have adopted different 
understandings of human, communitarian, and institutional dignity, leading to different 
conclusions over what these dignities mean for the constitutionality of the death penalty. For 
example, whereas Brennan concluded that the inherent worth of all human beings requires 
abolition, Kennedy has asserted that respect for human dignity is tied to moral virtue, and thus 
the death penalty is constitutional when the offender is sufficiently morally reprehensible. And, 
whereas “human dignity” appears to refer to some intrinsic quality of human beings, 
“communitarian” and “institutional” dignity appear to reflect a concern with how the community 
and institution should behave. That is, dignity is both an inherent quality that all humans have by 
virtue of being human, and is a guiding principle for ethical behavior on the part of the 
community and the institution.  
 The lack of a coherent and consistent approach to dignity might be attributable to one, or 
both, of two things. First, it might be symptomatic of the Court’s uncertain approach to 
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interpreting the Eighth Amendment prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments.”98 A judge 
who adopts the theory of originalism would look to how the Framers understood the idea of 
dignity (if that judge considers dignity to be relevant at all),99 whereas a judge who believes that 
the Constitution should be interpreted in light of prevailing standards might focus on their own 
understanding of dignity, as Brennan did, or might look to what the public consider to be 
compatible with respect for dignity, as the Court did between Gregg and Atkins. While the Court 
has in the past left the definition of “evolving standards of decency” largely to public opinion, 
we saw that in recent years Justice Kennedy in particular has reconfigured Eighth Amendment 
analysis so that the Justices play a more searching role in delimiting the contours of acceptable 
punishments, with dignity playing an increasingly prominent role in such determinations. 
A second plausible explanation for the Court’s confusing use of dignity lies in the more 
general problems with dignity as a legal and moral concept. Philosophers and jurists have long 
debated the meaning of dignity, and have perennially disagreed on the impact that dignity has, or 
should have, in any given context such as the imposition of capital punishment. It follows that 
we should explore the philosophical literature on dignity and the death penalty when questioning 
the role of dignity in Eighth Amendment analysis. However, given the lack of consensus within 
the philosophical literature, and given that philosophy does not necessarily translate into 
constitutional interpretation, we should use the Court’s existing dignity jurisprudence to frame 
our philosophical analysis. 
98 On the Court’s problematic and varying approach to Eighth Amendment analysis, see John C. 
Shawde, Jurisprudential Confusion in Eighth Amendment Analysis, 38 U. MIAMI. L. REV 357 (1984); Susan Raeker-
Jordan, A Pro-Death, Self-Fulfilling Constitutional Construct: The Supreme Court’s Evolving Standard of Decency 
for the Death Penalty, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 455 (1996); Susan Raeker-Jordan Kennedy, Kennedy, and the 
Eighth Amendment: “Still in Search of a Unifying Principle”? 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 107 (2011); JOHN D. BESSLER, 
CRUEL & UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT (2012) pp.26-27 
(“Eighth Amendment case law is in such a state of disarray that locating a unifying set of principles in that body of 
law is like trying to solve a Rubik’s Cube while blindfolded. It simply cannot be done.”)   
99 See n.106 infra and accompanying text 
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III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIGNITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY 
We might take the view that there is one correct conception of dignity as it relates to the death 
penalty, and our task then would be to first ascertain which of the judicial conceptions outlined 
above (if any) is the correct one according to the philosophical literature, and second to 
determine what that conception means for the constitutionality of capital punishment. So we 
might seek to defend Brennan’s position, or Kennedy’s, or Roberts’, for example. The approach 
taken in this paper, though, is that each conception of dignity raised by the various Justices is a 
valid concern for the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, but that each conception of 
dignity by itself is insufficient. The task, then, is to understand how the various dignities inter-
relate and inform one another. In this sense, the role of dignity is akin to a jigsaw puzzle: to get 
the complete picture, the judge needs to ensure that the various pieces of dignity are arranged in 
such a way that they properly connect with one another. Each piece by itself might appear 
unhelpful, similar to another piece, or even contrary to another piece, but it is nonetheless 
possible to develop a complete picture with a bit of work. 
The following pages address each of the three conceptions of dignity in turn. The first 
refers to the inherent human dignity of the people involved in the crime, including offenders, 
victims, offenders’ families, and victims’ families. The second—“communitarian dignity”—
refers to the dignity of the wider community in whose name the death sentence is being sought, 
and the dignity of the people involved in administering the death sentence. The third conception 
of dignity refers to the dignity and integrity of the legal system.  
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A. Human Dignity and the Death Penalty  
In the outline of the Court’s jurisprudence, we saw that several Justices have referred to the 
“inherent worth” of the offender, while others have referred to the worth of the victim. We also 
saw that different understandings of human dignity have led to different conclusions regarding 
the constitutionality of capital punishment. These inconsistencies are not unique to the question 
of the constitutionality of the death penalty in the US. In surveying the judicial use of human 
dignity in courts around the world, in a variety of contexts, Christopher McCrudden finds that 
“[t]here are significantly differing expressions of the relationship between human rights and 
dignity, and significant variations between jurisdictions in how dignity affects similar substantive 
issues.”100 
 These variations are possibly attributable to the variations in philosophical approaches to 
human dignity. In broad terms “the dignity of the person” refers to the idea that all human beings 
have worth and are important, and should be treated as such. However, this rudimentary 
definition raises a host of philosophical and legal questions which receive varying responses: 
What exactly is it about humans that means we have worth, or dignity? Does this mean that we 
have a right to have our dignity respected, or is dignity a principle that governs our conduct, or 
both? What sorts of things will constitute a breach of dignity? Will the infliction of pain and 
suffering breach one’s dignity, or is dignity more about autonomy and the ability to exercise self-
determination? Can we forfeit our dignity through immoral conduct? And how do all of these 
kinds of questions crystallize and play out in the context of a legal instrument, such as a 
constitution? 
100 Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655 
(2008). 
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For some, the idea of human dignity is unhelpful precisely because we cannot agree on 
the answers to these questions. The idea of dignity seems to lack sufficient definitional precision 
for its deployment in a legal context.101 The ambiguity of the term means that it can be used, and 
often is used, to justify a range of diametrically opposed opinions, thus undermining its 
normative force and usefulness. This is often the case, for example, in discussions about 
abortions. On one view, the “dignity of the woman” demands respect for her control over her 
body; on another view, respect for the “dignity of the unborn fetus” demands that abortion be 
prohibited.102  
The malleability of the concept has led Gerhold Becker to describe dignity as merely a 
“rhetorical device” which people resort to in order to make their moral arguments seemingly 
unassailable, particularly when they have no other means, such as empirical evidence, to 
strengthen their arguments.103 It has also been said by Helga Kuhse that the term is “nothing 
more than a shorthand expression for people’s moral intuitions and feelings.”104 That is, the 
person who is instinctively “pro-choice” will be led to focus on the dignity of the woman, 
whereas the person who is intuitively “pro-life” will be led to focus on the dignity of the fetus. 
The danger here, then, is that because the term is so malleable, justices on the US Supreme Court 
have been using dignity in order to advance their own view of what the Constitution should say 
about the death penalty, rather than to interpret the Constitution to understand what it does 
101 Michael Rosen, Dignity: The Case Against, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY (Christopher McCrudden ed., 
2013); Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 201 (2008). 
102 See Reva Siegal, Dignity and the Duty to Protect Unborn Life, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY 
(Christopher McCrudden (ed., 2013)  
103 Gerhold K. Becker, In Search of Humanity: Human Dignity as a Basic Moral Attitude, in THE FUTURE OF VALUE 
INQUIRY 53, 53 (Matti Hayry & Tuija Takala eds, 2001). Also see Michael Rosen, Dignity: The Case Against, in 
UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013).  
104 Helga Kuhse, Is there tension between autonomy and dignity?in 2 BIOETHICS AND BIOLAW 61, 72 (Peter Kemp et 
al. eds, 2000) 
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say.105 That is, they will not use dignity in order to help them reach a decision about the 
constitutionality of the death penalty, but instead the judge who instinctively opposes the death 
penalty will use dignity to justify the advancement of their moral view, just as the judge who 
supports capital punishment will find a way to use dignity to support its retention. These 
concerns reflect the more general disagreements among jurists about how the Constitution should 
be interpreted notwithstanding references to “dignity.” For those who ascribe to the theory of 
originalism, the text of the Constitution should be interpreted in light of how it would have been 
understood at the time of ratification, in part because such an approach limits, if not eradicates, 
the possibility of the judge acting as a moral philosopher and law-maker.106 This is why Justice 
Thomas—an ardent proponent of originalism—has rejected the judicial invocation of dignity in 
constitutional interpretation.107 Indeed, in many cases, justices have simply written the word 
“dignity” in their opinions without even offering any definition of the term,108 adding weight to 
the belief that the term is used for rhetorical purposes and to support a pre-ordained conclusion, 
rather than to help reach a conclusion.  
 This does not mean that the Court should abandon the concept of human dignity 
altogether, though. To do so would be contrary to decades of the Court’s jurisprudence.109 The 
105 Raoul Berger, Justice Brennan, “Human Dignity,” and Constitutional Interpretation, in THE CONSTITUTION OF 
RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES (Michael J. Meyer and William A. Parent eds., 1992). Writing 
about human dignity in legal orders around the world, Christopher McCrudden observes that “dignity seems open to 
significant judicial manipulation, increasing rather than decreasing judicial discretion.” Christopher 
McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 655 (2008).  
106 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1998). 
Note that “originalism” is an umbrella term for a variety of approaches that use the historical method to determine 
the meaning of the Constitution. 
107 See supra n. 33 
108 Erin Daly, for example, notes that “while the justices of the court, individually and collectively, do recognize the 
relevance of dignity to constitutional interpretation, they do not seem particularly interested in defining it.” ERIN 
DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH OF THE HUMAN PERSON, 97 (2012). 
109 Leslie Meltzner Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 178 (2011) (noting that Supreme 
Court Justices have invoked the term “dignity” in more than 900 opinions over the last 220 years, with “nearly half 
of these [900] opinions [appearing] after 1946, when the phrase “human dignity” first appeared in an opinion”.) 
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task instead is to construct a coherent framework of human dignity for the purposes of 
determining the constitutionality of the death penalty. Let us first consider the conceptions of 
human dignity that demand the imposition of capital punishment. We can then consider 
conceptions of dignity that permit the death penalty, and this is followed by conceptions that 
prohibit capital punishment. We will see that, in order to make sense of these conceptions, we 
need to consider the dignity of the community and the dignity of the legal institution. 
1. A conception of human dignity that demands the death penalty 
No Justice of the US Supreme Court has said that the Constitution demands the imposition of 
capital punishment; they have merely said that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments permit 
legislatures to enact death penalty statutes and carry out executions following due process. While 
this is probably because the text of the Constitution does not mandate capital punishment, this 
nonetheless sheds light on how the Justices have not, or feel that they cannot, adopt a strictly 
Kantian approach to dignity and the death penalty. This is despite the fact that Immanuel Kant is 
the obvious starting point for any philosophical discussion on dignity and the death penalty, 
since he provided the first sustained study of this relationship.110 For Kant, the death penalty is 
required for the crime of murder because any other punishment would be an affront to the dignity 
of the offender and the victim. Although Kant does not refer to the dignity of the community and 
legal institution, such concerns are implicit in his words. To explain this, we must first set out 
Kant’s approach to human dignity.  
 In the Groundwork for Metaphysics of Morals, Kant explains that human beings have 
“inner worth”, or dignity, because they are capable of rational thought and possess the ability to 
110 Carol Steiker, The Death Penalty and Deonotology, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL 
LAW (John Deigh and David Dolinko eds., 2011) p.441 
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act as free autonomous agents.111 Because humans are rational beings, they can never be used as 
a means to an end – that is, they must be treated with respect for their rationality and ability to 
act autonomously. Similarly, people do not differ in their worth, and are to be respected equally. 
This conception of human dignity demands both negative and positive types of treatment. To 
treat someone with respect for their human dignity involves both refraining from treating them in 
certain ways (eg, not inflicting unwanted physical or psychological harm), as well as positively 
treating them with due consideration and respect (eg, providing them with the conditions 
required for them to act autonomously).112 In this sense, we can see that dignity as “inner worth” 
can be implicated in various situations, including the infliction of pain and suffering,113 and the 
denial of free will.114   
From these premises, Kant justifies the retributive aim of state punishments for criminal 
offences. This is set out in his later work, The Metaphysics of Morals.115 Kant defends what can 
be called a “strict retributivism”, under which the state has a duty, and not just a license, to inflict 
certain punishments.116 For Kant, a state must impose a punishment that is equal to the crime 
(the principle of Ius Talionis) in order to respect the principle of equality, and in order to respect 
the dignity of the offender.117 This is because a rational moral agent (A) who chooses to treat 
another person (B) a certain way, is expressing his or her judgment about the way that people 
should be treated. In order to ensure that we treat (A) with respect for his or her rationality, then, 
we must treat him or her in the way that s/he has decreed. In other words, if a person kills, then 
111 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Thomas E. Hill and Arnulf Zweig eds., 
Arnulf Zweig trans., 2003) AK 4:434 – AK 4:436 
112 Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND 
AMERICAN VALUES (Michael J. Meyer and William A. Parent eds., 1992). p.15 
113 Gäfgen v. Germany, 22978/05 [2010] ECHR 759 (1 June 2010) 
114 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
115 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary J. Gregor ed., Mary J Gregor trans., 1996). 
116 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary J. Gregor ed., Mary J Gregor trans., 1996) AK 6:331 
117 Ius Talionis translates to the maxim “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.” 
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we must execute them in order to respect their dignity: “If… he has committed murder he must 
die.”118 Kant asserts that “whatever undeserved evil you inflict upon another within the people, 
that you inflict upon yourself”,119 explaining that a murderer must be executed since the 
murderer has inflicted the murder on himself. This is not to say that the murderer has literally 
killed him- or herself, but that they have rationally willed the taking of life. It is in this sense that 
the death penalty, and punishment more generally, fits with Kant’s categorical imperative—the 
basic moral rule that one should only act in a way that they would will into a universal law. 
Importantly, for Kant, the death penalty only serves legitimate retributive purposes when the 
offender is a rational moral agent, and thus the death penalty can only be imposed on rational 
moral agents who commit murder.  
Kant accepts that punishments do not have to literally mirror the crime, and so convict 
labor, for example, will suffice for theft since both involve security in property.120  He insists, 
though, that “[t]here is no similarity between life, however wretched it may be, and death, and 
hence no likeness between the crime and the retribution unless death is judicially carried out 
upon the wrongdoer”.121 
Kant’s thesis, though, is not just focused on the dignity of the offender. He asserts that 
states have a duty to punish because the integrity of the legal system, and the state as a whole, 
will be called into question if an offender escapes punishment. In explaining why a person 
sentenced to death should not be permitted to evade death by giving themselves up for medical 
experimentation for the purposes of developing medicines to save others, Kant writes: “justice 
118 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary J. Gregor ed., Mary J Gregor trans., 1996) AK 6: 333. 
For a fuller explanation of Kant’s position, see Benjamin S. Yost, Kant’s Justification of the Death Penalty 
Reconsidered, 15 KANTIAN REVIEW 1 (2010). 
119 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary J. Gregor ed., Mary J Gregor trans., 1996) AK 6: 332 
120 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary J. Gregor ed., Mary J Gregor trans., 1996) AK 6: 333 
121 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary J. Gregor ed., Mary J Gregor trans., 1996) AK 6: 333 
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ceases to be justice if it can be bought for any price whatsoever.”122 Although Kant here is 
concerned with the idea that dignity cannot be traded away, he also identifies a concern with the 
integrity of the legal system. He also addresses the role of the community in punishment. For 
Kant, even if a society voluntarily dissolves itself, the last murderer in prison must be 
executed.123 Although this could be taken to mean that human dignity does not depend on 
relations with others (even a person alone on an island has dignity), the point remains that it is 
the community that is required to act in order to respect the dignity of the individual.  
 In some respects, the Court appears to have adopted a Kantian approach to dignity. 
Justice Kennedy has referred to the “inherent worth” of individuals, and the Court has espoused 
individualized sentencing in order to determine whether an  offender is a morally rational agent, 
and thus eligible for capital punishment.124 However, the Court has long rejected the contention 
that a morally rational agent must be punished with death. Perhaps if the Court mandated the 
death penalty, we would then have a consistent and clear approach to the role of dignity in death 
penalty cases. Having said this, Kant recognizes that not all crimes can or should be punished 
with literal likeness, and he accepts that it would be morally reprehensible to punish the crime of 
rape by raping the offender.125 If we accept that there are some things that are so morally 
reprehensible that we should not mimic them, then it is at least arguable that state-sanctioned 
killing is morally reprehensible and thus not required within the Kantian tradition. Explaining 
why state-sanctioned killing is morally reprehensible requires a careful consideration not just of 
the dignity of the offender, but also of the integrity (or dignity) of the legal system. We would 
122 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary J. Gregor ed., Mary J Gregor trans., 1996) AK 6: 332 
123 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary J. Gregor ed., Mary J Gregor trans., 1996) AK 6: 333 
124 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 281 (demanding that those convicted of capital crimes are treated as “uniquely individual 
human beings, [and not] as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the 
death penalty.”)  
125 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary J. Gregor ed., Mary J Gregor trans., 1996) AK 6: 363 
(Appendix: Explanatory Remarks on The Metaphysical First Principles of the Doctrine of Right) 
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not punish rape with rape because this would require the legal system to justify, or require, 
another human being to commit the act of rape, and it is arguable that the legal system cannot 
maintain its integrity when it requires a human being to put another human being to death.126 We 
can already see, therefore, how the various dignities might be interconnected, and this is a theme 
returned to below in the section on institutional integrity. For now, given that the Court has 
instead used human dignity to say that the death penalty is permitted, we should explore the 
philosophical roots of this approach. 
2. A conception of human dignity that permits the death penalty 
It is clear from the Court’s jurisprudence that, since Trop v. Dulles was decided, a majority of 
justices have taken the view that although the death penalty is not required by the duty to respect 
human dignity, it is compatible with respect for dignity in some circumstances. A number of 
reasons have been given for this. First, Justice Kennedy in particular has tied human dignity to 
the idea of moral virtue, holding that those who lack moral virtue can be executed consistent 
with respect for their dignity. Second, some justices have asserted that the death penalty is 
permissible when it restores respect for the dignity of the victim. Third, albeit from a case not 
emanating from the Supreme Court, it has been argued that Kant’s conception of dignity permits 
the death penalty in cases involving volunteers for execution.127 Let us consider these in turn. 
 With respect to the first way in which capital punishment might be considered compatible 
with respect for human dignity, Louis Pojman has written: “Human beings have dignity as self-
conscious rational agents who are able to act morally. One could maintain that it is precisely 
their moral goodness or innocence that bestows dignity and a right to life on them. Intentionally 
126 Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity, and the Death Penalty, in THE CONSTITUTION OF 
RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES (Michael J. Meyer and William A. Parent eds., 1992). 
127 Order in Baal v. Godinez, No. 90-15716 (CA9, June 2, 1990) (Judge Kozinski, dissenting) 
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taking the life of an innocent human being is so evil that absent mitigating circumstances, the 
perpetrator forfeits his own right to life. He or she deserves to die.”128 In other words, human 
dignity is connected to behavior, and somebody who commits a particularly immoral act, such as 
murder, forfeits any claim to have their dignity and right to life respected unless they have 
mitigating circumstances.  
 A cursory look at the Supreme Court’s recent death penalty jurisprudence suggests that it 
is this conception of dignity that underpins the Court’s approach to the Eighth Amendment. We 
saw above that Justice Kennedy in particular has said that it is permissible to execute those who 
lack “moral goodness”, and that a sentence of death is only an affront to the offender’s dignity 
when that offender is nor morally reprehensible either because of their diminished capacity or 
because of the relative gravity of their crime.129 Indeed, Kennedy has been reluctant to consider 
the dignity of those who have been permissibly sentenced to death, suggesting that his concern 
with dignity is limited to assessments of moral culpability. That is, Kennedy has not expressed a 
concern with whether the time spent on death row, or methods of execution, comport with 
respect for human dignity,130 suggesting that he also considers death-eligible criminals to have 
forfeited their dignity claims. However, a closer look at Kennedy’s jurisprudence reveals that he 
is not clear on this point. He has repeatedly referred to the “inherent” dignity of people, and has 
explicitly stated that “Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons. 
Respect for that dignity animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual 
128 Louis Pojman, Why the Death Penalty is Morally Permissible, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY: SHOULD 
AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? - THE EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES MAKE THEIR BEST CASE (Hugo Adam 
Bedau and Paul G Cassell eds., 2004) at 56 
129 See supra Part II.B.2 
130 Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 
(2002); Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1 (2011) (denial of certiorari in all cases involving challenges to length of time 
on death row). Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008); Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. ___ (2015) (rejection of petitioners’ 
claims relating to methods of execution) 
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punishment.”131 Thus, whereas Pojman states that a convicted murderer “forfeits” their right to 
have their dignity respected, Kennedy believes that even convicted prisoners retain their dignity. 
Indeed, in a recent death penalty case, Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion to address 
the problems with solitary confinement, in which he expressed concerns with the dignity of those 
confined on death row.132 Although Kennedy did not invoke the term “dignity”, the concerns he 
expressed reflect concerns with respect for human dignity. Kennedy notes how solitary 
confinement can cause a person to “lapse in and out of a mindless state with almost no awareness 
or appreciation for time or his surroundings.”133 Further, in quoting from an earlier case, 
Kennedy notes that “A considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short [solitary] 
confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition . . . and others became violently insane; others, still, 
committed suicide.”134 This, then, suggests that Kennedy is concerned with how even the most 
morally culpable people are treated during their punishment. Kennedy’s jurisprudence, then, has 
wavered between saying that it is consistent with respect for human dignity to execute the 
morally reprehensible, and that even the morally reprehensible retain their dignity.  
It might be that these two positions are reconcilable. That is, perhaps the taking of life is 
consistent with dignity, so long as the treatment of the person leading up to their death is 
respectful. This is because death is the punishment, but the conditions on death row and the 
means for bringing about death are not. This is consistent with Kant’s position, since Kant 
expressly states that the imposition of capital punishment “must still be freed from any 
131 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011) 
132 Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. ___ (2015) 
133 Davis, 576 U.S. (Kennedy J. concurring, slip op. 2). It should be noted here that Kennedy was referring to 
depictions in literature of how solitary confinement affects individuals, citing CHARLES DICKENS, A TALE OF TWO 
CITIES (1859). While it could be reasonably said that a fictional account from 1859 is hardly relevant to 
contemporary constitutional analysis, Kennedy also refers to more recent scholarly work on this issue, including 
THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY (Norval Morris and 
David Rothman eds, 1995) 
134 Davis, 576 U.S. (Kennedy J. concurring, slip op. 2) 
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mistreatment that could make the humanity in the person suffering it into something 
abominable.”135 That is, the treatment of the person while awaiting execution, and the actual 
execution itself, must not be “abominable.” However, Kant and Kennedy differ in that the former 
advocated the mandatory death penalty in order to respect the inherent dignity of the person, 
whereas Kennedy does not.  
Furthermore, Kennedy refers to the inherent dignity of persons, while simultaneously 
holding that dignity is dependent on conduct. However, while our inherent characteristics might 
influence or even determine the way we act, our inherent characteristics are not necessarily 
contingent on our actions. For example, our inherent capacity to feel pain might influence our 
conduct, but we do not lose the ability to feel pain just because we act immorally as a result of 
feeling pain. Thus, we cannot say that dignity is something that we “inherently” have because of 
our characteristics as human beings, while simultaneously holding it to be contingent on virtuous 
conduct, for a person who acts without virtue still has the characteristics of being human. It is for 
this reason that Gerald Neuman says: “Those who assert that human dignity must be earned by 
virtuous conduct, or is unequally distributed, are talking about something else.”136  
Joshua Kleinfeld has offered an account of what such people are talking about. Kleinfeld 
draws a distinction between “human dignity” in the Kantian sense of inherent worthiness, and 
“democratic dignity”, which seems to more closely fit with Kennedy’s approach. Under this 
conception of dignity, it is the social contract, or democratic society, that is infused with moral 
goodness, and that is the basis of individual rights (as opposed to their inherent worth). One who 
transgresses the law has disrespected the dignity of the democratic order, thus justifying their 
135 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary J. Gregor ed., Mary J Gregor trans., 1996) AK 6: 333 
136 Gerald Neuman, Discourses of Dignity, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN DIGNITY (Christopher McCrudden ed., 
2013) at 638  
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treatment as something other than a human being: “Those who declare themselves to ‘live by 
another rule’ are enemies of justice, at war with all, and dangerous to all; they are ‘noxious 
creatures’ and, as such, rightless creatures who may properly be destroyed.”137   
To be consistent, then, the Court (or at least Justice Kennedy) needs to adopt one of two 
positions. First, the Court could stop referring to the “inherent” dignity of all persons, and adopt 
something like the conception of “democratic dignity”. This would involve adhering to the idea 
that some people no longer enjoy the right to live because they lack moral virtue. This could 
mean that conditions on death row or methods of execution need not meet the requirements of 
the Eighth Amendment, for it could be argued that such people deserve particularly harsh 
treatment, or lack the right to be free from cruel punishment. Alternatively, if the Court continues 
to state that dignity attaches to all persons, regardless of moral reprehensibility, then the Court 
must give serious consideration to whether conditions on death row and methods of execution 
violate human dignity. At the moment, the Court has taken neither of these approaches. It has 
consistently said that death row and executions must meet the requirements of the Eighth 
Amendment, but it has never considered the merits of claims that lengthy stays on death row 
violate the Eighth Amendment, and its method of execution jurisprudence has never addressed 
concerns with human dignity. Instead, in such cases it has focused on institutional dignity.138 
Again, we can see why we need to consider the relationship between the various types of dignity.  
 Louis Pojman has also defended the death penalty on the grounds that it restores the 
dignity of the victim: “the use of capital punishment respects the worth of the victim in calling 
137 Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN L. REV. 933, 1003-1006 (2016) (referring to, and 
quoting, the work of John Locke, JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 8, at 10 (C.B. Macpherson 
ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1980) (1690)) 
138 See infra Part III.C 
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for an equal punishment to be exacted from the offender.”139 In other words, imposing a 
proportionate punishment on an offender serves to restore the dignity of the victim.140 We saw 
that this view has found some support on the US Supreme Court, with Justice Powell referring to 
the dignity of the victim when explaining why he thought the death penalty is constitutionally 
permissible.141 Even in those cases in which the victim’s dignity is not expressly referred to, we 
see in some judgments an implicit attempt to highlight the dignity of the victim. In several cases, 
the Justices have recounted the suffering of the victim(s) when rejecting an appeal by a death 
row inmate.142 This serves to bring the victim’s voice and experience to light, and to remind 
readers of the worth of the victim, and the indignity suffered by them.  
Neither Pojman nor Powell, though, explain exactly how a proportionate punishment 
restores the dignity of the victim. Presumably there are many people who would feel undignified 
if they knew that they had brought about someone else’s death, and it could be argued that 
capital punishment is an affront to the dignity of the victim because further violence and killing 
is being carried out in their name, but without their consent. This is not to say that the death 
penalty is an affront to the dignity of the victim because the victim has no say in the matter. That 
is, I am not referring to a denial of the victim’s autonomy. It makes little sense to speak of a 
deceased person’s autonomy, since they cannot exercise their will, but we often speak of treating 
139 Louis Pojman, Why the Death Penalty is Morally Permissible, in DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY: SHOULD 
AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? - THE EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES MAKE THEIR BEST CASE (Hugo Adam 
Bedau and Paul G Cassell eds., 2004) at 61  
140 Carol Steiker, The Death Penalty and Deonotology, inTHE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL 
LAW (John Deigh and David Dolinko eds., 2011) (noting the views of those retributivists who argue that 
“punishment is required to undo the “demeaning message” of the low status of the victim promulgated by the 
crime.” p.442)  
141 Furman, 408 U.S. at 458 (Powell J. dissenting) 
142 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (permitting evidence of victim impact statements); Kansas v. Carr, 136 
S. Ct. 633 (2016) (recounting the suffering of the victims in detail) 
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the dead with dignity, through proper burials and so on.143 This means treating dead bodies with 
respect—we do not cast away dead bodies as we would cast away objects that we no longer use. 
Therefore, we should not objectify a deceased person by using them as a means to bring about an 
end, namely, the death of the perpetrator.  
To explain this further, we can consider two ways in which the dignity, or inherent worth, 
of victims’ families might be violated by the imposition of capital punishment. The first relates 
to the inevitable attention that is given to the death row inmate, particularly when an execution 
date is nearing. It is at least arguable that, as the inmate is cast as a victim of state violence and 
receives sympathy from some quarters, the feelings of the victims’ family are not adequately 
respected.144 A second way in which the dignity of the victims’ family might be implicated has 
been identified by the organization Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation (MVFR), which 
is made up of, and works for, the interests of family members of homicide victims who oppose 
capital punishment. MVFR issued a report in 2002 titled “Dignity Denied: The Experience of 
Murder Victims’ Family Members Who Oppose the Death Penalty”.145 The report highlights 
how victims’ families should be classed as victims too, given the suffering that they have 
endured. It then goes on to argue that those families who oppose the death penalty are treated 
without respect for their dignity when prosecutors seek death sentences against their wishes. 
Noting that the federal Victims of Crime Act 1984 begins by asserting “the right to be treated 
with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy”, the report provides examples 
of prosecutors ignoring the wishes of victims who do not want to see capital punishment 
143 Sheelagh McGuinness and Margaret Brazier, Respecting the Living Means Respecting the Dead too, 28 OXFORD 
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 297 (2008) 
144 Walter C. Long, The Death Penalty as a Public Health Problem, in DEATH PENALTY AND THE VICTIMS (UNITED 
NATIONS 2016) at 317. Also see Mickell Branham, Listening to Victims, in DEATH PENALTY AND THE VICTIMS 
(UNITED NATIONS 2016) 
145 MURDER VICTIMS’ FAMILIES FOR RECONCILIATION, DIGNITY DENIED: THE EXPERIENCE OF MURDER VICTIMS’ 
FAMILY MEMBERS WHO OPPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY (2002) 
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imposed in their names or in the names of their deceased loved ones.146 If we understand the 
phrase “to be treated with dignity” to mean to be treated with respect for one’s capacity to make 
choices and determine one’s own course of conduct, then we might argue that these families are 
actually being denied the opportunity to exercise their autonomy, and that the report uses the 
word “dignity” for rhetorical purposes. However, this misses the point of why family members 
speak out against the death penalty. It is not merely so that they can exercise their free will. 
These families do not want to see any more lives taken in their names, or in the names of their 
loved ones. This is because, in any other circumstances, we would feel undignified if we knew 
that we had unintentionally caused the death of another person. If I accidentally caused 
someone’s death through no fault of my own when driving, I would not complain that I was 
unable to exercise my autonomy (that is, I was unable to exercise my choice not to kill them), but 
I would feel undignified that, whether blameworthy or not, I caused someone’s death. Thus, for 
prosecutors to ignore the wishes of family members, and for a person to be executed in their 
name, is tantamount to causing family members to feel undignified, and is tantamount to using 
these victims as a means to an end. It is in this sense, then, that the dignity of the victim might be 
negatively implicated by the imposition of capital punishment: we might desecrate their memory 
by using their name as a means to end, to bring about the death of another.147 Thus, it cannot be 
said unequivocally that implementing the death penalty “in the name of the victim” necessarily 
restores the victim’s dignity. This is what Justice Brennan seems to be saying when he writes: 
146 On this, see Charles F. Baird and Elizabeth E. McGinn, Re-Victimizing the Victim: How Prosecutorial and 
Judicial Discretion Are Being Exercised to Silence Victims Who Oppose Capital Punishment 15 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV 447 (2004) 
147 For an example, see the story of the parents of Eric Autobee, a corrections officer who was murdered in 2002. Mr 
and Mrs Autobee opposed the decision of the prosecutor to seek death against the perpetrator, with a court filing 
stating: “Eric would not speak disdainfully of inmates, but, instead, recognized their human dignity…. Eric would 
not have wanted someone killed in his name, nor would he have wanted his family to live in the darkness of hatred.” 
Mickell Branham, Listening to Victims, in DEATH PENALTY AND THE VICTIMS (UNITED NATIONS 2016) 53-54 
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“when the state punishes with death, it denies the humanity and dignity of the victim”.148 Of 
course, the prosecutor might argue that they are seeking a death sentence in the name of the 
wider community, rather than in the name of the victim of the victim’s family. This highlights 
the relevance of communitarian dignity to philosophical and legal discussions about dignity and 
the death penalty, which is considered below. 
A third way in which respect for dignity might justify the use of capital punishment 
occurs when we conflate dignity with autonomy. It has been argued that when a death row 
inmate requests to waive their appeals and volunteers for execution, we should permit this out of 
respect for the inmate’s dignity. Nicole Dailo has argued that “to fully understand the dignity 
interests that death row inmates value most, and therefore, the dignity interests that the courts 
should protect, dignity in the death penalty context must also be defined as autonomy.”149 This is 
the view put forward by Judge Kozinski on the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.150 The 
case centered on Thomas Baal’s request to waive his appeals, and his parents’ objection to this 
on the grounds that he was not mentally competent to volunteer for execution. In finding Baal 
competent, Kozinski expressly referenced Kant when writing: “It has been said that capital 
punishment is cruel and unusual because it is degrading to human dignity....But the dignity of 
human life comes not from mere existence, but from that ability which separates us from the 
beasts— the ability to choose; freedom of will. When we say that a man— even a man who has 
committed a horrible crime—is not free to choose, we take away his dignity just as surely as we 
do when we kill him. Thomas Baal has made a decision to accept society’s punishment and be 
148 William J. Brennan Jr, Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the Court 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 313, 331 (1986) 
149 Nicole Dailo, “Give Me Dignity by Giving Me Death”: Using Balancing to Uphold Death Row Volunteers’ 
Dignity Interests amidst Executive Clemency, 23 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 249, 264 (2014).  
150 Order in Baal v. Godinez, No. 90-15716 (CA9, June 2, 1990), 
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done with it. By refusing to respect his decision we denigrate his status as a human being.”151 In 
other words, Kozinski claims that to restrict Baal’s autonomy (“the ability to choose, freedom of 
will”) would be tantamount to denying him his dignity. Simultaneously, though, Kozinski notes 
that to “kill him” would also “take away his dignity.”  
 This issue is not confined to those already sentenced to death. Many people serving 
sentences of life without the possibility of parole have argued that they would prefer to be 
executed, rather than to spend many more years languishing behind bars.152 Should we retain the 
death penalty for those who want to be executed, out of respect for their dignity? There are at 
least two reasons for answering this question in the negative. First, a number of courts have 
recognized that individual interests and rights do not always trump other interests such as the 
integrity of institutions, including the medical profession and the legal system. For example, in 
1993 the Supreme Court of California upheld the right of a quadriplegic prisoner to refuse life-
sustaining food and medical treatment, but noted that in some cases it might be necessary to rule 
against the individual’s self-determination in the interests of maintaining the integrity of the 
medical profession.153 Thus, we can see how the issue of institutional dignity is relevant to cases 
that seem to primarily involve respect for individual autonomy. A second reason for asserting 
that respect for dignity does not require or permit the death penalty in such circumstances lies in 
151 Order in Baal v. Godinez, No. 90-15716 (CA9, June 2, 1990), quoted in Alex Kozinski, Tinkering with Death, in 
DEBATING THE DEATH PENALTY : SHOULD AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? THE EXPERTS ON BOTH SIDES 
MAKE THEIR BEST CASE (Hugo Adam Bedau and Paul G Cassell eds., 2004) at 9 (referring to Kant’s Critique of 
Pure Reason) (emphasis added) 
152 See, for example, TOO CRUEL, NOT UNUSUAL ENOUGH (Kenneth E Hartman ed., 2013). John Stuart Mill argued 
that the death penalty is required to respect the dignity of offender because the alternative—languishing in prison—
is antithetical to respect for dignity. See George A. Thoma, A Note on John Stuart Mill’s Views on Capital 
Punishment, 3 HISTORY OF ECONOMICS SOCIETY BULLETIN 49 (1981).  
153 Thor v Superior Court, (1993) 5 Cal 4th 725. See also R(Brady) v Collins [2000] EWHC 639 (Admin) (England 
and Wales). In this case, Maurice Kay J opined, without deciding, that competent prisoners could still be force-fed 
if, on the facts, countervailing interests such as the integrity of the medical profession outweighed the prisoner’s 
rights to self-determination: “it would seem to me to be a matter for deep regret if the law has developed to a point 
in this area where the rights of a patient count for everything and other ethical values and institutional integrity count 
for nothing”, at [73]. 
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understanding the relationship between autonomy and dignity. If we equate dignity with 
autonomy, then we might feel compelled to answer in the affirmative, but we should not be so 
quick to equate dignity with autonomy.154 It makes perfect sense, for example, to speak of “death 
with dignity” in the context of assisted suicide and euthanasia for those who cannot exercise their 
autonomy, such as those in a persistent vegetative state. In other words, “death with dignity” 
does not mean “death with autonomy.” To further explain why respect for autonomy is not 
necessarily the same as respect for dignity, we can explore how Kant understood the term 
autonomy. Kant used the term to describe the idea that human beings can govern themselves, but 
he asserts that self-governance must be done in accordance with certain duties attached to moral 
worth and a sense of dignity.155 So, for Kant, to commit suicide would contravene one’s own 
dignity since, in Kant’s view, no rational being can will their own annihilation.156 In a legal 
context, the famous dwarf-tossing case from France illustrates how dignity and autonomy are 
linked but not synonymous.157 In France, the authorities prohibited the practice of dwarf-tossing 
on the grounds that it violated the dignity of those involved, notwithstanding the fact that the 
dwarf in question actually wanted to participate in such events since it provided him with gainful 
employment and a sense of self-worth. In other words, his autonomy to work as he pleased was 
over-ridden on the grounds that he could not consent to a practice that was antithetical to dignity, 
154 Ruth Macklin has argued that “dignity is a useless concept” because it means nothing more than “autonomy” and 
therefore does not add anything to moral and legal debates. See Ruth Macklin, Dignity is a Useless Concept, 
327 BMJ 1419 (2003). 
155 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Thomas E. Hill and Arnulf Zweig eds., 
Arnulf Zweig trans., 2003) AK 4:436. Also see Michael Rosen, Dignity: The Case Against, in UNDERSTANDING 
HUMAN DIGNITY (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013) at 150 
156 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Thomas E. Hill and Arnulf Zweig eds., 
Arnulf Zweig trans., 2003) AK 4:422 
157 Conseil d’Etat, 27 October 1995, Commune de Morsang-sur-Orge, no. 136727, Rec. Lebon 372, Commune de 
Morsang-sur-Orge v Société Fun Production et M Wackenheim. 
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both his dignity and the dignity of society at large.158 With this in mind, it is arguable that no 
rational being can will their own execution, in the same way that, in Kant’s view, they cannot 
rationally will suicide.159  
 It is difficult to find a judicial conception of human dignity, then, that unassailably either 
demands or permits the death penalty. The Court’s current attempt to tie dignity to moral virtue 
is problematic partly because of the Court’s use of the phrase “inherent worth”, and partly 
because the Court has not been consistent in applying concerns with human dignity across the 
application of the death penalty. To be consistent in his assertion that the Eighth Amendment 
must ensure respect to the treatment of people in prison, Kennedy must consider how dignity 
relates to the treatment of people on death row, and to methods of execution. These two issues, 
as we will now see, offer grounds for arguing that respect for dignity actually demands the 
abolition of capital punishment.  
3.  A conception of human dignity that prohibits the death penalty 
There are two ways in which Kant’s conception of human dignity might pull towards abolition. 
The first lies in Kant’s own qualification to his position on the death penalty. Kant asserts that 
death penalties must be carried out with respect for the inherent dignity of the person. That is, the 
158 Another example would be an attempt to justify slavery on the grounds that the slave desires bondage: “slavery is 
wrong even if it is not experienced as a negative by the slave and even if the slave maintains a substantial amount of 
de facto autonomy.” Kent Greenawalt, Dignity and Victimhood, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 779, 781 (2000). Also see Leslie 
Meltzner Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 222 (2011) 
159 For a much more detailed account of how Kant’s approach to suicide can be applied to capital punishment, see 
Attila Ataner, Kant on Capital Punishment and Suicide, 97 KANT STUDIEN (2006). Ataner writes: “as it is irrational 
(or self-contradictory) and hence impermissible for me to frame a suicidal maxim from an ethical standpoint, it is 
also irrational and hence impermissible for me to frame a capital penal law as a co-legislator in the social contract 
from a political standpoint.” (at 457). Kant rejects suicide on the grounds that from an ethical, internal law-making 
standpoint, no rational agent can will their own death. His discussion of capital punishment, on the other hand, is 
rooted in the political domain—that is, the domain relating to the way in which a society organizes itself, rather than 
the internal ethical domain relating to how a person governs their own life. While this might seem to preclude an 
application of his approach to suicide to discussions about capital punishment, Ataner makes the point that under the 
Kantian tradition, rational agents are all co-legislators, and thus they cannot will the formulation of a capital penal 
law which will lead to their execution.  
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sentence of death and the execution “must still be freed from any mistreatment that could make 
the humanity in the person suffering it into something abominable.”160 It has been argued by 
several commentators that conditions on death row, the lengthy time between sentence and 
execution, and the methods of execution, all inflict “abominable” suffering on the individual.161 
Therefore, even if Kant’s position is theoretically consistent, he himself would not accept the 
death penalty as it is practiced today for its administration does not respect the dignity of the 
individual.162 As noted above, though, the Court has repeatedly refused to hear constitutional 
challenges to the time spent on death row163 and has neglected to consider the dignity of the 
person in cases involving methods of execution.164 We can surmise that if the Court did agree to 
hear these cases, and did adopt Kant’s approach to dignity, then it would likely decide in favor of 
petitioners. As noted above, this is particularly applicable in the context of Justice Kennedy’s 
exhortations on the subject of dignity and the Eighth Amendment, and Kennedy has recently 
indicated a willingness to explore this issue in the context of solitary confinement. 
Perhaps the clearest use of human dignity to argue in favor of abolition can be found in 
Justice Brennan’s decision in Furman, in which he explained that capital punishment is not 
compatible with respect for the inherent worth of a human being because such a punishment 
involves treating people as a means to an end.165 As we saw in Part I, judges in other countries 
and drafters of international human rights law have agreed with Brennan. In the US, Justice 
160 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary J. Gregor ed., Mary J Gregor trans., 1996) Ak 6: 333. 
161 Nelson T. Potter Jr, Kant and Capital Punishment Today, 36 THE JOURNAL OF VALUE INQUIRY 267, 275-281 
(2002); Robert Johnson, Reflections on the Death Penalty: Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Dehumanization in 
the Death House, 13 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 583 (2015). 
162 Nelson T. Potter Jr, Kant and Capital Punishment Today, 36 THE JOURNAL OF VALUE INQUIRY 267 (2002). 
163 Lackey v. Texas , 514 U.S. 1045 (1995); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 
(2002); Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1 (2011). Also see Kara Sharkey, Delay in Considering the Constitutionality of 
Inordinate Delay: The Death Row Phenomenon and the Eighth Amendment, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 861 (2013) 
164 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1879); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947); Glass v. 
Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080 (1985); Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008); Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. ___ (2015). Also 
see Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IOWA L. REV. 319 (1997) 
165 Furman, 408 U.S. at 272-273  
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Palmer of the Connecticut Supreme Court has explained how “the death penalty has been 
imposed disproportionately on those whom society has marginalized socially, politically, and 
economically: people of color, the poor and uneducated, and unpopular immigrant and ethnic 
groups.  It always has been easier for us to execute those we see as inferior or less intrinsically 
worthy.”166 The corollary of this is that if we recognize that all people are equally intrinsically 
worthy, as Kant does, then we would not impose death sentences on anyone. 
It is also arguable that the death penalty violates the dignity of the condemned’s family. 
The stigma of having a relative on death row, the feelings of guilt by association, and the 
prolonged suffering inherent in knowing that a family member will be executed, all contribute to 
feelings of lower worth and indignity.167 Although the Justices of the US Supreme Court have 
not tended to consider the dignity of the condemned’s family members, they have recognized 
that the dignity of the wider community, and the dignity of the institution, are both relevant to 
Eighth Amendment considerations of the death penalty. It is necessary, then, to consider what 
these dignities mean for the constitutionality of capital punishment. As we will see, these 
dignities help shed light on what human dignity means for capital punishment. 
B. Communitarian Dignity 
To explain what is meant by communitarian dignity, we can turn once again to Chief Justice 
Warren’s statement in Trop v. Dulles: “The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is 
nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment 
stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”168 While 
166 State of Connecticut v Eduardo Santiago, 318 Conn. 1, 54 (2015) 
167 SUSAN F. SHARP, HIDDEN VICTIMS: THE EFFECTS OF THE DEATH PENALTY ON FAMILIES OF THE ACCUSED (2005); 
Sandra Joy, Socio-Psychological Challenges of ‘Death Row families’, in DEATH PENALTY AND THE VICTIMS 
(UNITED NATIONS 2016) 
168 Trop, 356 U.S. at 100   
47 
 
                                                 
DRAFT COPY: 
An edited version of this paper will be published in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 
2 (forthcoming 2016). 
 
this prima facie appears to be focusing on the dignity of the person facing punishment, the 
reference to “civilized standards” suggests that we need to consider the possibility that the 
dignity of the community and of the people imposing the punishment might be implicated by 
capital punishment. Up until now, we have focused on the dignities of the perpetrator, the victim, 
and the victims’ families. However, we must remember that it is prosecutors who seek death 
sentences, jurors (representing the community) who impose death sentences, and state officials 
who work on death row and carry out executions, in the community’s name.  
This is the view that Justice Marshall took in Furman when he asserted that “the Eighth 
Amendment is our insulation from our baser selves.”169 Put simply, when we degrade another 
person’s dignity, we fall below dignified, or civilized, standards ourselves. A community can, 
and should, act in a dignified manner towards its members. When the community does not act 
virtuously, then it has not acted with dignity. We can refer to this as “communitarian dignity”, 
and this conception of dignity extends the Aristotelian notion of personal excellence to the 
community as a whole.170 This is what Leslie Meltzner Henry means when she writes of the 
“collective virtue” of society.171 It should be noted that this is not the equivalent to the 
aggregation of the dignity of the individual members within the community. We are not speaking 
here about the inherent worth of a group of people that needs to be respected, but rather we are 
speaking of “dignity” as a guiding principle. Recently, in Hall v. Florida, Justice Kennedy 
explained that dignity in the communitarian sense is not so much about the worth of the 
community or the individuals within it, but is rather about the way in which a community of 
people should aspire to behave towards its members: “The Eighth Amendment’s protection of 
169 Furman, 408 U.S. at 345 
170 Leslie Meltzner Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 221 (2011) 
171 Leslie Meltzner Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 220 (2011) 
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dignity reflects the Nation we have been, the Nation we are, and the Nation we aspire to be.”172 
However, while Kennedy has invoked the moral aspirations of the Nation in order to restrict the 
scope of the death penalty, he has not adopted Marshall’s position that the death penalty is 
always contrary to the dignity of the Nation.  
This begs the question whether or not the imposition of the death penalty degrades the 
dignity of the community in whose name the death sentence is administered.173 In Gregg v. 
Georgia, Justice Stewart justified the imposition of the death penalty on the grounds that some 
crimes threaten the humanity of the community as a whole.174 Matthew Kramer has adopted a 
similar line of argument, putting forward a “purgative rationale” for capital punishment.175 In his 
view, the death penalty can be justified when a “community is tainted—in other words, its moral 
integrity is lessened—by the continuing existence of anyone who has perpetrated some 
especially hideous crimes and who is within the jurisdiction of the community or otherwise 
specially connected to it. To avert or remove that taint, a community must devote some of its 
resources to terminating the life of such an offender.”176 Capital punishment, then, is justified 
when a community needs to “purge” itself of people who are “defilingly evil” and whose 
continued existence threatens the moral integrity—or dignity—of the community.177  
172 Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) 
173 For the view that it does, see Stephen B. Bright, The Role of Race, Poverty, Intellectual Disability, and Mental 
Illness in the Decline of the Death Penalty, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 671, 691-692 (2015) (“The death penalty is not only 
degrading to the person who is tied down and put down, but it is degrading to the society that carries it out. It 
coarsens society, telling future generations that problems can be solved with more violence.”) 
174 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184 
175 MATTHEW KRAMER, THE ETHICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF EVIL AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES (2011). 
176 MATTHEW KRAMER, THE ETHICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF EVIL AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES (2011) 186-187 
177 Kramer describes his account as a “purgative rationale” for capital punishment. See MATTHEW KRAMER, THE 
ETHICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF EVIL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (2011) 8, 
179-265 
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On these views, the fact that the community supports the punishment suggests that the 
dignity of the community is not negatively affected by the imposition of capital punishment. 
However, there are two reasons for avoiding this conclusion. First, remember the French dwarf-
tossing case.178 Sometimes, the mere fact that a person or persons chooses to do something does 
not in and of itself make that conduct dignified or compatible with human dignity. Second, even 
if we take the view that Justice Stewart and Kramer are actually ignoring public opinion, and are 
instead stating what they think the community needs, there are deficiencies with their rationales. 
Kramer’s justification, which is mirrored in Stewart’s reasoning, rests on two premises: (a) that 
the continued existence of an offender might threaten the integrity of the community, and (b) that 
removing the individual will remove the stain from the community. This seems to neglect the 
fact, though, that it is the crime that stains the community, rather than the individual. Removing 
the person does nothing to remove society’s memory of the crime, and the effect of the crime on 
society.  
The idea of “collective virtue”, then, does not axiomatically justify the retention of 
capital punishment. In fact, as stated by Justice Marshall, it can pull towards abolition. Carol 
Steiker explains why the death penalty might be incompatible with a communitarian conception 
of dignity: “inflicting death… as punishment can, in addition, damage or destroy the human 
capacities [for compassion and empathy] of those of us in whose name the punishment is 
publicly inflicted.”179 In other words, extreme punishments such as the death penalty “violate 
human dignity—not because of what it does to the punished, but rather because of what it does to 
178 See supra n.157 and accompanying text 
179 Carol Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 
58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 773 (2005). 
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all of us.”180 In the South African case of State v. Makwanyane, Justice Madala was one of 
several justices to note that the death penalty “diminished the dignity of our society as a 
whole.”181 The South African Constitution enshrines the idea of Ubuntu, which is defined by 
Justice Langa as a value “which places some emphasis on communality and on the 
interdependence of the members of a community.”182 As such, while the execution of a person 
might deny that person their dignity, we must also remember that the very act of sentencing a 
member of our community to death degrades our dignity too. Every execution, it could be 
argued, demeans society’s respect for life. Even Kant recognized that, if imposed improperly, the 
death penalty implicates the dignity of the community: “there can be disgraceful punishments 
that dishonor humanity itself (such as quartering a man, having him torn by dogs, cutting off his 
nose and ears). Not only are such punishments more painful than loss of possessions and life to 
one who loves honor (who claims the respect of others, as everyone must); they also make a 
spectator blush with shame at belonging to a species that can be treated that way.”183 
Marshall, Steiker and the South African Constitutional Court have offered partial reasons 
for why “communitarian dignity” pulls towards abolition. To get a fuller picture of how this 
understanding of dignity demands abolition, we must understand the relationship between 
“collective virtue” and the dignity of the people involved in the crime. This first involves 
understanding the death penalty as a “cultural symbol.” The relatively low numbers of people 
affected by capital punishment suggests that the death penalty should not attract much concern or 
180 Carol Steiker, No, Capital Punishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 
58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 773 (2005). 
181 Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391, at [237] 
182 Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391, at [224]. Also see Thaddeus Metz, Human Dignity, Capital Punishment, and an 
African Moral Theory: Toward a New Philosophy of Human Rights, 9 JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 81 (2010). Metz 
suggests that the idea of communitarian dignity is particular to African moral theory, but Chief Justice Warren and 
Justice Marshall have shown that his conception of dignity is applicable in the US context too. 
183 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Mary J. Gregor ed., Mary J Gregor trans., 1996) Ak 6: 463 
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attention, but it is undeniably a topic that generates heated debate and holds considerable public 
interest. This is because “[c]apital punishment says something about where a culture stands on 
matters of violence, evil, wrongdoing, and rights”.184 That is, the death penalty tells us about 
community’s response to the dignity of the individuals involved in the crime. To explain this, we 
can consider the views of Robert Johnson, Stephen Smith, and Mary Neal, who have all posited 
approaches to human dignity that situate individual dignity within its social context. That is, they 
assert that we cannot understand an individual’s inherent worth without first understanding the 
nature of human relationships.  
Mary Neal has pointed out that under Kant’s conception, those who are not rational, such 
as babies and the mentally ill, do not possess dignity.185 However, it is difficult to accept that we 
can treat babies and the mentally ill without respect for their dignity, and thus we commit 
ourselves to respecting the dignity of even those who lack capacity to assert their right to have 
their dignity protected. In fact, as Neal points out, the vulnerability of those who lack capacity 
actually provides a reason for taking special steps to protect their dignity, and this is illustrated 
by Justice Kennedy’s rationale in both Roper and Hall, outlawing the death penalty for juvenile 
offenders and the intellectually disabled respectively. Neal puts forward an account of dignity 
that is inextricably tied to the idea of vulnerability.186 She suggests that every individual is 
vulnerable in the sense that (a) their well-being depends, to varying extents, on other people, and 
(b) they are open to harm from other people. Put another way, “even the least vulnerable human 
being is still fundamentally, and inescapably, vulnerable in the negative sense, since none of us 
184 Joshua Kleinfeld, Two Cultures of Punishment, 68 STAN L. REV. 933, 987 (2016)  
185 Mary Neal, “Not Gods but Animals”: Human Dignity and Vulnerable Subjecthood, 33 LIVERPOOL LAW 
REVIEW 177 (2012).  
186 Mary Neal, “Not Gods but Animals”: Human Dignity and Vulnerable Subjecthood, 33 LIVERPOOL LAW 
REVIEW 177, 193 (2012). On vulnerability generally, see MARTHA A. FINEMAN, VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON 
A NEW ETHICAL FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS (2013). 
52 
 
                                                 
DRAFT COPY: 
An edited version of this paper will be published in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 
2 (forthcoming 2016). 
 
can meet her basic needs and satisfy her core desires without the co-operation of others; and even 
the most capable adult is vulnerable to hurt and harm, both physical and emotional.”187 The main 
point to take from this is that our dignities and inherent worth are brought into focus through our 
relationships with other people.  
Robert Johnson and Stephen Smith have also asserted that a person’s dignity can only be 
understood with reference to their connections with other people.188 Johnson first sets out a 
conception of human dignity that bears similarities to Kant’s conception: “Human beings are 
endowed with the capacity for a conscious awareness of self that marks the individual as distinct 
and separate from others”.189 However, Johnson emphasizes that human beings can only exercise 
their capacity for self in a social setting. That is, “[s]elf–determination is necessarily achieved in 
the world of other human beings through a process of self-defining social interactions.”190 This 
understanding of what it means to be human informs his answer to the question “What does it 
mean to respect a person’s human dignity?”191 According to Johnson, “The essential respect due 
another human being is to treat him or her as a human being with the right to live as a human 
being”.192 Stephen Smith takes a similar view. According to Smith, “the concept of dignity 
appears to owe much more to the social community of being human.”193 This approach obviates 
187 Mary Neal, “Not Gods but Animals”: Human Dignity and Vulnerable Subjecthood, 33 LIVERPOOL LAW 
REVIEW 177, 187 (2012). (italics in original) 
188 Robert Johnson, Reflections on the Death Penalty: Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Dehumanization in the 
Death House, 13 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 583 (2015). It is unique in the sense that all punishments could be said 
to be degrading but there is something special about the infliction of death as a punishment. 
189 Robert Johnson, Reflections on the Death Penalty: Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Dehumanization in the 
Death House, 13 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 583, 584 (2015). 
190 Robert Johnson, Reflections on the Death Penalty: Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Dehumanization in the 
Death House, 13 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 583, 585 (2015). 
191 Robert Johnson, Reflections on the Death Penalty: Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Dehumanization in the 
Death House, 13 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 583, 586 (2015). 
192 Robert Johnson, Reflections on the Death Penalty: Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Dehumanization in the 
Death House, 13 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 583, 586 (2015). 
193 STEPHEN W. SMITH, END-OF-LIFE DECISIONS IN MEDICAL CARE: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES FOR REGULATING THE 
DYING PROCESS (CAMBRIDGE BIOETHICS AND LAW) (2012) pp.138-139 
53 
 
                                                 
DRAFT COPY: 
An edited version of this paper will be published in Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, Volume 44, Issue 
2 (forthcoming 2016). 
 
the need to find some inherent characteristic like autonomy or rationality. In Smith’s words: 
“Dignity appears to come from our being part of a particular social group - that of human beings. 
Since the requirement for participation in this social group is to be a member of the species homo 
sapiens, all who fit within that criteria are capable of joining the group. As such, all human 
beings are entitled to be treated as part of that group. Human dignity is the expression of that 
entitlement but it does not depend on the possession of particular characteristics which all 
humans are expected to have. Human beings are entitled to be treated as if they matter because 
membership in the social group entitles one to that consideration.”194  
It is in this sense that Smith describes dignity as “an ethical brake”.195 That is, we 
generally use the term dignity when claiming that a person or persons should not treat another 
person as though they were not a member of the human community. Thus, the concept of dignity 
does not just protect the (potentially) abused, it also protects the (potential) abuser from acting in 
an uncivilized, or undignified, manner.  
If dignity is the expression of the entitlement to be treated as a human being, then it 
becomes clear that “[t]o impose sanctions that damage and dehumanize is antithetical to basic 
human rights; such sanctions deny and suppress a person’s humanity and hence violate one’s 
inherent human dignity.”196 Peggy Cooper Davis also explains “the physical… [and] the 
psychological and social aspects of respect for human dignity.”197 Thus, a violation of dignity 
occurs when a person is denied membership of the human species, and this can be done when a 
194 STEPHEN W. SMITH, END-OF-LIFE DECISIONS IN MEDICAL CARE: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES FOR REGULATING THE 
DYING PROCESS (CAMBRIDGE BIOETHICS AND LAW) (2012) p.139 
195 STEPHEN W. SMITH, END-OF-LIFE DECISIONS IN MEDICAL CARE: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES FOR REGULATING THE 
DYING PROCESS (CAMBRIDGE BIOETHICS AND LAW) (2012) p.138 
196 Robert Johnson, Reflections on the Death Penalty: Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Dehumanization in the 
Death House, 13 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 583, 588 (2015). 
197 Peggy Cooper Davis, Responsive Constitutionalism and the Idea of Dignity, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1373, 1374 
(2009). 
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person is “dehumanized.” Although neither Johnson nor Smith explicitly discuss how this 
understanding of human dignity implicates the dignity of the wider community, Brenda Hale has 
succinctly explained that “[r]espect for the dignity of others is not only respect for the essential 
humanity of others; it is also respect for one’s own dignity and essential humanity. Not to respect 
the dignity of others is also not to respect one’s own dignity.”198 
The question, then, is whether the death penalty dehumanizes and assaults the physical 
and psychological dignity of those who are sentenced to death, and what this means for the 
dignity of the community. Johnson surveys life on death row in order to make the argument that 
the death penalty is always dehumanizing, for “prisoners on death row are relegated to a kind of 
existential limbo, existing as entities in cold storage rather than living as human beings with even 
a modicum of self-determination.”199 This is probably too far: even death row prisoners have a 
“modicum” of self-determination, and it is more accurate to say that their ability to live as human 
beings is severely curtailed, rather than prevented altogether. That being said, Johnson’s point is 
valid to the extent that when we destroy a person’s life, we cannot be said to be treating them as 
a member of the human family.  
The main point to take from this analysis is that the individual’s human dignity cannot be 
conceived separately to the dignity of the wider community, and vice versa. Thus, while Johnson 
(and Smith and Neal) are concerned with the dignity of the individual, and thus perhaps their 
views should have been discussed in the section on inherent worth, or as a separate conception of 
dignity altogether, their accounts shed light on the implications for the collective virtue, or 
dignity, of the community.  
198 Brenda Hale, Dignity, 31 JOURNAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND FAMILY LAW 101, 106 (2009). 
199 Robert Johnson, Reflections on the Death Penalty: Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Dehumanization in the 
Death House, 13 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 583, 589 (2015). 
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We should not restrict ourselves to the dignity of the people in whose name the death 
sentence is carried out, though. Lauren de Lilly has provided a thorough account of how the 
dignity of the persons involved in administering the death sentence, from the prosecutor who 
seeks the death penalty through to the executioner, is implicated by the psychological harm 
suffered by these people as a result of sending other human beings to their death.200 Just as the 
community is debased, so those who administer death sentences are also debased. Several former 
executioners have spoken out against the death penalty partly on the grounds of the emotional 
and psychological harm that they have suffered.201 In many ways, the integrity of the legal 
system is threatened by the fact that the legal institution might threaten the dignity of those 
involved in the legal process. This leads to another conception of dignity, which I term 
“institutional dignity.” 
C. Institutional Dignity 
Dignity is not always attached to a human being, and the US Supreme Court has long 
acknowledged the dignity of certain institutions and offices, rather than of the individual per se. 
For example, in The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, Chief Justice John Marshall explained 
that “A foreign sovereign is not understood as intending to subject himself to jurisdiction 
incompatible with his dignity, and the dignity of his nation.”202 Cases involving state immunity 
200 For a thorough account of the harm and psychological trauma suffered by those involved in the execution 
process, see Lauren M. de Lilly, “Antithetical to Human Dignity”: Secondary Trauma, Evolving Standards of 
Decency, and the Unconstitutional Consequences of State-Sanctioned Executions 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 107 
(2014) 
201 See, for example, Allen Ault, I Ordered Death in Georgia, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 25, 2011; Justin Jouvenal, Ex-
Virginia Executioner Becomes Opponent of Death Penalty, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 10, 2013 (discussing Jerry 
Givens, who now speaks out against the death penalty partly on the grounds of the harm it inflicts on executioners). 
For the view that the dignity of prison guards is also affected by conditions on death row, see Walter C. Long and 
Oliver Robertson Prison Guards and the Death Penalty, PENAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL (2015). p. 1 
202 ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH OF THE HUMAN PERSON (2012) at 74  
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from civil suits have also invoked reference to the dignity of the institution.203 In many respects, 
this conception of dignity is tied to the older idea of dignity as something that reflects the higher 
social status of monarchs and aristocrats, in the sense that it is the sovereign status of the entity 
that gives it dignity.204 In addition to these conceptions of institutional dignity, Justice Kennedy 
has alluded to the dignity of the institution of marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges.205  
In death penalty cases, the Court has on occasion referred to the dignity of the 
courtroom,206 the dignity of “judicial proceedings”,207 the “integrity not just of one jurist, but of 
the larger institution”208 and the “dignity of the procedure” in the context of methods of 
execution.209 Moreover, the Court has sometimes assumed that the dignity of the institution is 
separable to respect for the dignity of the individual, or the dignity of the community. In this 
sense, the Court has upheld the dignity of the legal institution at the expense of human dignity, 
pulling the Court away from interfering with how states use the death penalty. This much was 
clear in the case of McCleskey, in which Justice Powell accepted the possibility of people being 
sentenced to death on the basis of skin color, but did not act on this possibility largely because he 
did not want to call into question the integrity of the legal system as a whole.210 Similarly, we 
have seen that Chief Justice Roberts’ concern with the “dignity of the procedure” in Baze led him 
to conclude that a method of execution which looks dignified is more important than a concern 
203 Leslie Meltzner Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 195-197 (2011); Judith Resnik and 
Julie Chi-Hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN 
L. REV. 1921, 1941-1946 (2003). 
204 Judith Resnik and Julie Chi-Hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of 
Sovereignty, 55 STAN L. REV. 1921, 1923 (2003). (“This turn to dignity as a justification for or as an explanation of 
state power within the United States is actually a return to an older conception of the sovereign. Monarchs were the 
sovereigns to whom dignity belonged in eras when ordinary persons were not due such respect and deference.”) 
205 Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __ (2015) 
206 Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005)  
207 Wellons v. Hall, 558 U.S. 220 (2010) 
208 Williams v Pennsylvania¸ 579 U.S. ___ (2016), 
209 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) 
210 See supra n.85 and accompanying text 
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with the pain that an inmate might actually feel.211 What neither Justice Powell nor Chief Justice 
Roberts acknowledge, though, is that such an approach actually demeans the dignity or integrity 
of the legal system precisely because such an approach threatens the dignity of the individual. 
That is, a concern with “institutional dignity” arguably requires the system to pay due regard to 
human dignity.  
To illustrate this point, we can turn our attention to the United Kingdom. Speaking about 
capital punishment in the UK, Lord Denning seemed to suggest that it is permissible for innocent 
people to remain jailed, and presumably executed, if to do so would maintain the “integrity,” and 
therefore dignity, of the legal system: “Hanging ought to be retained for murder most foul. We 
shouldn’t have all these campaigns to get the Birmingham Six released if they’d been hanged. 
They’d have been forgotten, and the whole community would be satisfied… It is better that some 
innocent men remain in jail than that the integrity of the English judicial system be 
impugned.”212 For Denning, then, the hallowed status of the judicial system means that its 
procedures and decisions must be respected over and above the dignity of the person wrongly 
imprisoned. This in itself is not an argument that the Supreme Court should steadfastly retain 
capital punishment. At most, his statement about maintaining the dignity of the institution simply 
cautions against respecting the dignity of the wrongfully convicted. This was an approach 
espoused by Justice Scalia, who claimed that respect for legal procedures can exclude appeals 
based on new evidence pertaining to the innocence of a condemned person on death row.213  
211 See supra n.89 and accompanying text 
212 Quoted in EVAN WHITTON, THE CARTEL: LAWYERS AND THEIR NINE MAGIC TRICKS (1988) p.117 
213 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) 
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Scalia was widely criticized for this view, especially in light of the considerable number 
of exonerations from death row.214 For many, the dignity of the institution requires respect for 
human dignity, and the two dignities are not mutually exclusive. Similarly, we might say that the 
dignity of the institution depends on the dignity of the individuals that occupy positions in that 
institution. It is helpful to consider these two approaches in turn. 
1. Institutional dignity requires respect for human dignity 
It is arguable that, in order to maintain its dignity, the legal system must ensure that death 
sentences are carried out with appropriate solemnity, given the seriousness of the issue. This 
includes a requirement that officials exonerate those who are innocent, contrary to Lord 
Denning’s and Justice Scalia’s assertions. It also requires that death sentences are only imposed 
out on those considered deserving of death, after due process and careful consideration, contrary 
to Justice Powell’s position.215 It also requires, as Kant argued, that executions do not inflict 
excessive pain on the inmate, contrary to Chief Justice Roberts’ approach.  
To explain this, let us consider the potential implications of this approach for McCleskey. 
Not only should the Court have considered the harm that a racially discriminatory death penalty 
inflicts on the dignity of the legal system and the Fourteenth Amendment, but it also should have 
considered the human dignity of racial minorities who are subjected to capital punishment on the 
basis of skin color rather than moral culpability.216 Support for this view can be found in the 
experiences of South Africa and Germany. Several of the Justices in Makwanyane pointed out 
that the death penalty had been a vital component in the machinery of Apartheid, and noted that 
214 For a list of individuals exonerated from death row since 1973, see Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence: 
List of those freed from death row (2016), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innocence-list-those-freed-death-row. 
215 It should be noted that in both Wellons and Williams, respect for institutional dignity resulted in findings that due 
process had been violated. 
216 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) 
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to retain the integrity of the new constitutional order, the Constitution and the country had to 
sever the remnants of Apartheid, such as capital punishment.217 In other words, if an institution 
perpetuates a historical wrong such as the treatment of minorities without respect for their 
individual human dignity or their dignity as a community, then it is arguable that that institution 
is not acting in a dignified manner. Germany faced a similar situation after World War Two, 
when it abolished the death penalty in part because of its associations with Nazism.218 Applying 
this to the United States, it has long been argued that today’s death penalty in America is 
inextricably linked to America’s history of racial subjugation, whether it be in the form of 
slavery or lynching.219 This line of argument is premised on the historical and contemporary 
racially discriminatory application of the death penalty, and it is therefore plausible to argue that 
the retention of capital punishment, and the racial discrimination inherent in the application of 
the death penalty, demeans the legal system and the values of the Fourteenth Amendment which 
purports to provide “equal protection under the law”, because it perpetuates the historical wrongs 
of racial subjugation, which itself was premised on an assault on the dignity of racial minorities. 
217 See in particular the opinion of Justice O’Regan, Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391, [318]-[344] (“Respect for the 
dignity of all human beings is particularly important in South Africa. For apartheid was a denial of a common 
humanity… The death sentence was imposed sometimes for crimes that were motivated by political ideals. In this 
way the death penalty came to be seen by some as part of the repressive machinery of the former government… In 
conclusion, then, the death penalty is unconstitutional. It is a breach of the rights to life and dignity that are 
entrenched in sections 9 and 10 of our Constitution, as well as a breach of the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and 
degrading punishment contained in section 11(2). The new Constitution stands as a monument to this society’s 
commitment to a future in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect. We cannot postpone 
giving effect to that commitment.”) 
218 Those who were inclined to view the death penalty as a symbol of Nazism were joined by Nazi sympathizers, 
who were eager to abolish the death penalty in order to prevent convicted war criminals from being executed. See 
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2002) p.240 (“The 
harshness of the death penalty in the post-war trials incited an unholy alliance in the post-war legislature of Nazi 
sympathizers, who were anxious to shelter their friends, and left-wing penal reformers. These rather different 
constituencies joined forces to prohibit capital punishment in the May 1949 German Basic Law”). Also see 
RICHARD J. EVANS, RITUALS OF RETRIBUTION: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN GERMANY, 1600-1987 (1996); Charles 
Lane, The Paradoxes of a Death Penalty Stance, WASHINGTON POST, Jun. 4, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/03/AR2005060301450.html. 
219  FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Charles J. Ogletree, 
Jr and Austin Sarat eds., 2006). 
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As Christopher Bracey has written, “[t]he struggle for racial justice in America… is perhaps best 
understood as a struggle to secure dignity in the face of sustained efforts to degrade and dishonor 
persons on the basis of color.”220 
Yet another way in which institutional dignity depends on respect of human dignity can 
be found in the work of Lauren de Lilly, referred to above, who has insightfully argued that the 
human dignities of the people involved in seeking, handing down, and executing death sentences, 
are all implicated by capital punishment. This is because, as de Lilly outlines, the act of 
condemning someone to death, and the act of killing that person, imposes considerable 
psychological harm.221 There is an argument that the legal system is not acting in a dignified way 
if, in order to function, it necessarily disrespects the dignity of those charged with operating the 
system, or requires those individuals to act in an undignified way. Indeed, we saw above that the 
Supreme Court of California has recognized the relationship between the dignity and integrity of 
the medical profession, and the rights of prisoners’ to bring about their own death through refusal 
of life-sustaining treatment. That is, it might be contrary to the integrity of the medical 
profession to compel medics to allow someone to die, and it is thus arguable that the integrity of 
the medical profession is compromised when medics are called to take life through the 
administration of lethal injections.222 
220 Christopher Bracey, Dignity in Race Jurisprudence, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L 669, 671 (2005). (“The struggle for 
racial justice in America, then, is perhaps best understood as a struggle to secure dignity in the face of sustained 
efforts to degrade and dishonor persons on the basis of color”) 
221 For a thorough account of the harm and psychological trauma suffered by those involved in the execution 
process, see Lauren M. de Lilly, “Antithetical to Human Dignity”: Secondary Trauma, Evolving Standards of 
Decency, and the Unconstitutional Consequences of State-Sanctioned Executions 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 107 
(2014) 
222 For an outline of the professional medical organizations, such as the American Medical Association, that have 
called for practitioners to refuse to be involved in executions on the grounds that such involvement is contrary to 
medical ethics and the Hippocratic Oath, see Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine 
Has Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 49, 79-84 (2007). Also see the database of resolutions and 
statements by medical organizations on the Death Penalty Information Center’s website: 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/lethal-injection-statements-medical  
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2. Institutional dignity depends on the dignity of the individuals administering the institution 
To further explain how institutional dignity cannot be divorced from respect for human dignity, 
we must recognize that the institution is made up of individuals. This includes the prosecutor 
who uses his or her office to seek a death sentence, the jury who must decide whether to impose 
a death sentence, and the prison workers and executioners who carry out the death sentence. The 
dignity of the institution depends on its members “acting with dignity” when carrying out their 
jobs and duties. When a prosecutor is undignified in their actions—for example, they abuse their 
power and withhold exculpatory evidence from the defense—then the dignity and integrity of the 
system is called into question. Individuals who use the legal system to condemn people to death 
on the basis of skin color are not acting with dignity, they are not respecting the dignity of the 
person sentenced to death, and thus the integrity of the legal system is called into account.223  
Taking these strands of thought together, then, we could say that for an institution to 
retain its dignity and integrity, the people administering that institution must act with dignity, and 
must be treated with dignity. If the individuals administering the institution act without dignity, 
or if the institution demeans human beings by requiring them to act without respect for the 
dignity of another person, then that institution itself is demeaned. In this sense, capital 
punishment threatens the integrity and dignity of the judicial and legal system, as well as the 
human dignity of the people involved in its administration. For this reason, it is arguable that 
institutional dignity pulls towards the abolition of capital punishment.  
It can be seen, then, that the relationship between “institutional dignity” and the death 
penalty is complex, and that “institutional dignity” is not separable and distinct from “human 
dignity” or “communitarian dignity.” Thus, when Chief Justice Roberts invoked the “dignity of 
223 For a recent US Supreme Court decision condemning racism within the administration of the death penalty, see 
Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. ___ (2016) 
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the procedure” when considering the constitutionality of a particular lethal injection protocol, he 
erred in not also addressing the dignities of the people affected by this.224 It is with all this in 
mind that we can now see the necessity of considering a variety of conceptions of dignity when 
discussing cases involving capital punishment. 
 
D. Dignity(s) and the Death Penalty 
The above analysis has shown that the death penalty implicates various dignities, and that any 
judicial consideration of the death penalty must consider how these various dignities relate to one 
another. While it might seem as though the various conceptions sometimes pull in different 
directions, we can still use these approaches to map out the relationship between dignity 
generally and capital punishment. This is because the various approaches complement each 
other. When I say that the approaches complement each other, I mean that the various 
conceptions shed light on each other, cohere with one another, and that the picture of dignity vis-
à-vis the death penalty is not complete without an acknowledgement of all the relevant 
conceptions of dignity. That is, we cannot make sense of the offender’s human dignity without 
working out how it connects to the community’s dignity, and the dignity of the institution.  
In some ways, this builds on the Wittgensteinian approach to understanding dignity, as 
explained by Leslie Meltzner Henry. She contends that “dignity has multiple meanings that… 
share “family resemblances” to each other.”225 For Henry, dignity is not reducible to some other 
concept such as autonomy or inherent worth, and has no “core meaning that is applicable across 
224 Baze, 553 U.S. (Stevens J. concurring in judgment) describing Chief Justice Roberts’ use of the dignity of the 
procedure as “woefully inadequate” p.3 (slip. op) 
225 Leslie Meltzner Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 177 (2011). quoting wittgenstein 
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all contexts.”226 The Court’s jurisprudence bears this out, but whereas some dignity-skeptics 
have used this to call for a retreat from invoking dignity, Henry takes the view that this “family 
resemblances” approach is welcome, for it allows dignity to serve various helpful purposes 
across a range of situations. 
To explain further how the various dignities overlap and inter-relate, we can consider 
how communities and legal institutions treat death row inmates as they near execution. Many 
states permit offenders to say last words, have a choice of last meals, and be put to death 
“humanely.” On the face of it, we permit death row inmates these opportunities to exercise their 
self-determination, and we attempt to minimize the pain they might feel, so that inmates can “act 
with dignity” as they go to their death, and so that they do not suffer the physical pain that would 
constitute an undignified death. However, any gesture of humanity that does take place, whether 
it be in the form of last meals or last words, actually serves “to make condemned prisoners 
complicit in their own executions, thereby hiding the underlying violence at work.”227 In other 
words, on closer inspection, we are not treating inmates with respect for their dignity, for we are 
using them as a means to an end – we are surreptitiously making them complicit in their own 
executions, so that we can claim that the community’s dignity remains intact,228 and so that we 
can claim that the legal institution that has imposed and carried out the death sentence has acted 
with dignity. This is particularly true of the move towards lethal injections in the quest for 
“humane” executions. It is widely recognized now that far from seeking to protect the dignity of 
the individual, such a method is instead geared towards protecting the sensibilities of the 
226 Leslie Meltzner Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 177 (2011) 
227 Robert Johnson, Reflections on the Death Penalty: Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Dehumanization in the 
Death House, 13 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 583, 597 (2015). 
228 Daniel La Chance, Last Words, Last Meals, and Last Stands: Agency and Individuality in the Modern Execution 
Process, 32 Law & Soc. Inquiry 701 (2007) 
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community, and the integrity of the State carrying out the execution.229 In Robert Johnson’s 
words: “This seductive collusion, so antithetical to human dignity, may be among the most 
glaring violations of human rights that come in the wake of executions. We hide this shameful 
deceit behind form and protocol, aided by surface gestures of humanity.”230 So, in order to 
understand that we are not respecting the inherent worth or autonomy of the inmate, we must 
consider the dignity of the community and the dignity of the procedure.  
The contention that the death penalty debases the dignity of all the people and institutions 
involved is hardly a novel contention. Cesare Beccaria made similar observations some 250 
years ago in his famed On Crimes and Punishments.231 In his treatise, which inspired the 
Framers,232 Beccaria makes his views on this clear: “What are men to think when they see wise 
magistrates and the solemn ministers of justice order a convict to be dragged to his death with 
slow ceremony, or when a judge, with cold equanimity and even with a secret complacency in 
his own authority, can pass by a wretch convulsed with his last agonies, awaiting the coup de 
grace, to savour the comforts and pleasures of life?”233 Although Beccaria does not use the word 
“dignity”, his sentiments are clearly echoed in the sentiments expressed throughout this article. 
The death penalty implicates the dignity of the offender (“a wretch”), the dignity of the 
community (the reference to “men” can be assumed to mean the community at large), and the 
dignity of those “solemn ministers of justice” who administer the institution.  
229 Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, The Death of Dignity, in IS THE DEATH PENALTY DYING? EUROPEAN AND 
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 204 (Austin Sarat and Jürgen Martschukat eds., 2011). 
230 Robert Johnson, Reflections on the Death Penalty: Human Rights, Human Dignity, and Dehumanization in the 
Death House, 13 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 583, 597 (2015). 
231 CESARE BECCARIA, BECCARIA: “ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS” AND OTHER WRITINGS (Richard Bellamy ed., 
Richard Davies et al. trans., 1995) 
232 JOHN D. BESSLER, THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW: AN ITALIAN PHILOSOPHER AND THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (2014); John D. Bessler, Revisiting Beccaria’s Vision: The Enlightenment, America’s Death Penalty, 
and the Abolition Movement, 4 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 195 (2009). 
233 CESARE BECCARIA, BECCARIA: “ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS” AND OTHER WRITINGS (Richard Bellamy ed., 
Richard Davies et al. trans., 1995) p.70 
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The complexity of understanding the ways in which institutional, communitarian, and 
human dignity inform and shape one another is another reason why the Court should not defer to 
majoritarian impulses in its Eighth Amendment analysis. Justice Marshall recognized this when 
he said that people might instinctively support capital punishment, but would surely reject it if 
they gave the matter informed thought.234 Marshall also understood that to defer to legislative 
judgments would be an abdication of the judicial role: “deference to the legislature is tantamount 
to abdication of our judicial roles as factfinders, judges and ultimate arbiters of the 
Constitution.”235 Justice Jackson made it clear that the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect 
minority groups, including criminals, from the whims of public opinion: “The very purpose of a 
Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to 
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles 
to be applied by the courts. One’s right to life,… and other fundamental rights may not be 
submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.”236 In abolishing the death 
penalty on dignitarian grounds, the South African Constitutional Court also explained why 
public opinion should not dictate judicial determinations of whether or not a particular 
punishment comports with the requirement to respect dignity: “Public opinion may have some 
relevance to the enquiry [into the constitutionality of the death penalty], but in itself, it is no 
substitute for the duty vested in the Courts to interpret the Constitution and to uphold its 
provisions without fear or favour. If public opinion were to be decisive there would be no need 
for constitutional adjudication.”237 When examining what the concept of dignity should mean for 
234 Furman, 408 U.S. at 361-2. 
235 Furman, 408 U.S. at 359 
236 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
237 State v. Makwanyane, 1995 (3) SA 391, [88] (CC) (S. Afr.). Judges on other supreme and constitutional courts 
have developed rich traditions of elaborating the meaning of dignity in constitutional analysis, suggesting that it is 
feasible for a judge to invoke dignity in a principled and coherent manner, in order to help them reach a conclusion 
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the constitutionality of the death penalty, then, we must be careful not to equate respect for 
human dignity with respect for public opinion. 
It is little surprise to find that as some Justices have moved away from relying on 
objective indicia of national opinion “to the maximum extent possible”, they have 
simultaneously paid greater heed to the views of experts and the opinions of the worldwide 
community238 to help them with their understanding of human dignity, and how the dignity of 
the community and of the legal system depend on respect for the dignity of individuals.  
  
CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that the death penalty implicates a complex web of various dignities, and 
that the various dignities themselves consist of a cluster of issues. Moreover, as constitutional 
courts around the world have come to realize, the interconnectedness of these dignities pulls 
unequivocally towards abolition. I do not mean to suggest that the Court should use dignity to 
abolish the death penalty merely because other courts have, but rather that the approaches to 
dignity in the philosophical literature and in the jurisprudence of other courts reveals problems 
with the US Supreme Court’s current use. Although some conceptions of dignity might appear to 
warrant the death penalty, it is only when we build a picture made up of the various conceptions 
that we can understand why the death penalty is not compatible with dignity, however conceived.  
rather than merely buttress their own subjective views. See Paul Sourlas, Human Dignity and the Constitution, 7 
JURISPRUDENCE 30 (2015) for an account of how the German Constitutional Court has long given thoughtful 
considerations to the meaning of dignity. See AHARON BARAK, HUMAN DIGNITY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUE AND 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (2015) Chapter 15 for an account of how the Supreme Court of Israel has understood 
dignity for the purposes of constitutional interpretation. See ALBIE SACHS, THE STRANGE ALCHEMY OF LIFE AND 
LAW (2011) for an account of dignity in South African case law. 
238 For a thorough account of how courts around the world have referred to each other’s jurisprudence in order to 
understand the role of dignity in death penalty cases, see Paolo G. Carozza, “My Friend is a Stranger”: The Death 
Penalty and the Global Ius Commune of Human Rights, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1031 (2003). But note the view of Neomi 
Rao that US courts should not deploy “European ideals of human dignity” (Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of 
Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 201, 201 (2008)). 
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In an essay on how the Eighth Amendment is underpinned by human dignity, which in 
turn demands the abolition of the death penalty, Hugo Adam Bedau explains how the imposition 
of capital punishment cannot be compatible with respect for human dignity: “It is conceptually 
impossible… for a person in a given act to deserve condemnation by the law for the criminality 
of that act and for the person to have proved by this act that he is no longer a person at all—but 
only a creature who now lacks any moral standing in the community of persons.”239 This article 
has added to this view by showing that it is impossible for a community or legal system to retain 
dignity when asserting that a fellow human being is no longer worthy of living.240 For these 
reasons, if the Court is going to invoke dignity in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, then it 
must hold that capital punishment is contrary to the prohibition on “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”  
239 Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity, and the Death Penalty, in THE CONSTITUTION OF 
RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES (Michael J. Meyer and William A. Parent eds., 1992) at 176 
(emphasis in original)  
240 For recent work that explores the effect of capital punishment on wider society and the legal system, see Walter 
C. Long, The Death Penalty as a Public Health Problem, in DEATH PENALTY AND THE VICTIMS (UNITED NATIONS 
2016); James R. Acker, The Death Penalty: Killing what we instead could be, in DEATH PENALTY AND THE VICTIMS 
(UNITED NATIONS 2016) 
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